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 2  From the Heritage of African American 
Slavery to Modern Civil Rights Protection 
 Justice Thurgood Marshall, the fi rst African American to sit on the United States Supreme 
Court, had been chief  counsel for the National Association for the Advancement of 
Colored People Legal Defense and Education Fund (NAACP LDF). 1  In that role, and 
following his mentor Charles Hamilton Houston, Marshall led the legal fi ght to end seg-
regation, including his ultimately successful argument in  Brown v.  Board of Education . 2  
He had also experienced the massive resistance by Southern states for many years after 
the Supreme Court rulings striking down offi cial segregation. By the mid-1970s, many of 
those who had resisted began to object that the courts had been involved in these matters 
for too long. 
 This issue arose when the fi rst major affi rmative action case was discussed by Supreme 
Court justices in conference. Justice Marshall was outraged at the very idea that the legacy 
of segregation had been adequately addressed in America. He wrote a memorandum to the 
other justices which said in part:
 I repeat, for next to the last time:  the decision in this case depends on whether you 
consider the action of the Regents as admitting certain students or as excluding certain 
other students. If  you view the program as admitting qualifi ed students who, because of 
this Nation’s sorry history of racial discrimination, have academic records that prevent 
them from effectively competing for medical school, then this is affi rmative action to 
remove the vestiges of slavery and state imposed segregation by “root and branch.” If  
you view the program as excluding students, it is a program of “quotas” which violates 
the principle that the “constitution is color-blind.” 
 If  only the principle of color-blindness had been accepted by the majority in  Plessy 
in 1896, we would not be faced with this problem in 1978. We must remember, however, 
that this principle appeared only in the dissent. In the 60 years from  Plessy to  Brown , 
ours was a Nation where, by law, individuals could be given “special” treatment based 
on race. For us now to say that the principle of color-blindness prevents the University 
from giving “special” consideration to race when this Court, in 1896 licensed the states 
to continue to consider race, is to make a mockery of the principle of “equal protection 
under law.” 
 As a result of our last discussion on this case, I wish also to address the question 
of whether Negroes have “arrived.” Just a few examples illustrate that Negroes most 
certainly have not. In our own Court, we have had only three Negro law clerks, and not 
so far have we had a Negro Offi cer of the Court. On a broader scale, this week’s U.S. 
News and World Report has a story about “Who Runs America.” They list some 83 
persons—not one Negro, even as a would-be runner-up. And the economic disparity 
between the races is increasing …. 
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 The dream of America as the melting pot has not been realized by Negroes—either 
the Negro did not get into the pot, or he did not get melted down. The statistics on 
unemployment and the other statistics quoted in the briefs of the Solicitor General and 
other amici document the vast gulf  between White and Black America. That gulf  was 
brought about by centuries of slavery and then by another century in which, with the 
approval of this Court, states were permitted to treat Negroes “specially.” 
 This case is here now because of that sordid history … We are not yet all equals, 
in large part because of the refusal of the Plessy Court to adopt the principle of 
color-blindness. It would be the cruelest irony for this Court to adopt the dissent in 
Plessy now and hold that the University must use color-blind admissions. 3  
 He was not able to convince his colleagues and, what was worse, the plurality opin-
ion rejecting his argument was written by Justice Lewis Powell. 4  It seemed to Marshall 
that Powell had gone out of  his way to dismiss his admonition to his colleagues. 5  For 
Marshall, not only was Powell wrong and insensitive, he was a powerful reminder of  the 
kind of  urbane and sophisticated Southerner who had maintained and perpetuated the 
segregated society against which Marshall had fought his entire professional life. 6  Powell 
had been a member of  the Richmond School Board and later of  the Virginia Board of 
Education during the years of  massive resistance. In his dissent to the Court’s opinion, 
Marshall again tried to explain that there was more at stake than a narrow legal argu-
ment. There was a heritage of  slavery and discrimination that remained unresolved and 
only partially addressed.
 I do not agree that petitioner’s admissions program violates the Constitution. For 
it must be remembered that, during most of  the past 200 years, the Constitution as 
interpreted by this Court did not prohibit the most ingenious and pervasive forms 
of  discrimination against the Negro. Now, when a State acts to remedy the effects of 
that legacy of  discrimination, I cannot believe that this same Constitution stands as a 
barrier. 
 Three hundred and fi fty years ago, the Negro was dragged to this country in chains 
to be sold into slavery. Uprooted from his homeland and thrust into bondage for forced 
labor, the slave was deprived of all legal rights. It was unlawful to teach him to read; he 
could be sold away from his family and friends at the whim of his master; and killing or 
maiming him was not a crime. The system of slavery brutalized and dehumanized both 
master and slave …. 
 The position of the Negro today in America is the tragic but inevitable consequence 
of centuries of unequal treatment. Measured by any benchmark of comfort or achieve-
ment, meaningful equality remains a distant dream for the Negro …. 
 It is more than a little ironic that, after several hundred years of  class-based dis-
crimination against Negroes, the Court is unwilling to hold that a class-based remedy 
for that discrimination is permissible .... It is unnecessary in 20th-century America to 
have individual Negroes demonstrate that they have been victims of  racial discrimina-
tion; the racism of our society has been so pervasive that none, regardless of  wealth 
or position, has managed to escape its impact. The experience of  Negroes in America 
has been different in kind, not just in degree, from that of  other ethnic groups. It is not 
merely the history of  slavery alone but also that a whole people were marked as inferior 
by the law. And that mark has endured. The dream of America as the great melting 
pot has not been realized for the Negro; because of  his skin color he never even made 
it into the pot. 7  
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 Nearly ten years later, when the nation was preparing to celebrate the bicentennial of the 
Constitution, Marshall once again tried to make clear the need to understand the true 
heritage of slavery and segregation. He gave a speech at the Annual Seminar of the San 
Francisco Patent and Trademark Law Association that caused considerable consternation 
among those who wanted to paint the bicentennial and the document it celebrated in glow-
ing terms. 8  The fact that a justice of the United States Supreme Court was suggesting that 
the nation should use the occasion of the 200th anniversary to recognize the weaknesses 
of the Constitution, the efforts to address those defi ciencies, and the work that remained 
to make real the values the nation was preparing to celebrate was startling to many and 
scandalous to some. 
 Marshall began by reminding his audience that when the framers began the Preamble 
to the Constitution by speaking of “We the people,” they were not referring to everyone. 
Slaves were clearly not included, and women would not be fully included as voting citizens 
for more than one hundred thirty years after that. It took, he said, a civil war, the post-Civil 
War amendments, and a long-running battle in the courts for African Americans to begin to 
enjoy what white Americans had taken for granted. “Thus,” he wrote:
 in this bicentennial year, we may not all participate in the festivities with fl ag-waving 
fervor. Some may more quietly commemorate the suffering, struggle, and sacrifi ce that 
has triumphed over much of what was wrong with the original document, and observe 
the anniversary with hopes not realized and promises not fulfi lled. I plan to celebrate 
the bicentennial of the Constitution as a living document, including the Bill of Rights 
and the other amendments protecting individual freedoms and human rights. 9  
 Justice Marshall worked diligently to make clear the importance not only of understand-
ing the specifi c arguments over issues of civil rights law, but of placing those cases into the 
historical context of the United States. This chapter seeks to do both of those things. It 
will present the case law that evolved over time in cases of critical importance to African 
Americans and to civil rights more generally. Second, the cases are edited and presented 
in an effort to be clear about the relationship between the legal issues and the history that 
Marshall was convinced needed to be kept in mind. 
 The Heritage of Slavery and Racism 
 As Marshall explained, there is a need to come to grips with the heritage of slavery and 
racism along with the need to see the development of civil rights law. That requires fi rst a 
recognition of the failure of the Constitution to attack slavery and its actual legalization of 
that practice for the fi rst two decades of the new country’s life. Second, it is important to 
read carefully not only the rulings but also the language of early judicial opinions that both 
supported slavery and demeaned African Americans. Third, it is important to consider the 
post-Civil War amendments that sought to address that sad heritage and deplorable judicial 
pronouncements. 
 Cracks in the Foundation: The Failure to Attack Slavery and its Legitimation in 
the Constitution 
 As Marshall said, there is no contradiction in recognizing the positive contributions of the 
Constitution, particularly as it has evolved over two hundred years, and simultaneously 
recognizing the serious damage that was done by the unwillingness or perhaps the perceived 
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inability to address the problems of racism in the original document. Consider the problems 
that Marshall and other African Americans have recognized in the document, but that oth-
ers have been unwilling to address. 
 Marshall started his criticism with the preamble, fi nding that “We the people” certainly 
did not include African Americans. 10  In defi ning those who were to be counted in the appor-
tionment of representatives, Article I, §2, without using the term “slavery,” made clear that 
each slave was to be counted only as “three-fi fths” of a person. 
 Even worse than the humiliation of the three-fi fths compromise was the fact that the 
Constitution legalized and even protected slavery. Article I, §9, cl. 1 provided that: 
 The Migration or Importation of such Persons as any of the States now existing 
shall think proper to admit, shall not be prohibited by the Congress prior to the Year 
one thousand eight hundred and eight, but a Tax or duty may be imposed on such 
Importation, not exceeding ten dollars for each Person. 
 Slavery was to be protected for twenty years. Further, Article V provided for a process to 
amend the Constitution, but that same provision stated that “no Amendment which may be 
made prior to the Year One thousand eight hundred and eight shall in any Manner affect 
the fi rst and fourth Clauses in the Ninth Section of the fi rst Article.” Even the extraordinary 
process of constitutional amendment during those twenty years could not stop it. 
 Just to make sure that the interests of slave owners were protected, Article IV, §2, cl. 3 
added what was known as the fugitive slave clause, which provided that:
 No Person held to Service or Labour in one State, under the Laws thereof, escaping into 
another, shall, in Consequence of any Law or Regulation therein, be discharged from 
such Service or Labour, but shall be delivered up on Claim of the Party to whom such 
Service or Labour may be due. 
 Even after importation of slaves was outlawed, the slave trade continued until the Civil War. 
 Marshall knew that historians had argued that the Constitution was extremely progres-
sive for its time and that the compromises made regarding slavery in the Constitution were 
essential for obtaining the agreement of Southern states. First, he said, the profi ts of slavery 
did not fl ow only to Southerners. “New Englanders engaged in the ‘carrying trade’ would 
profi t from transporting slaves from Africa as well as goods produced in America by slave 
labor.” 11  Second, “the effects of the framers’ compromise have remained for generations. 
They arose from the contradiction between guaranteeing liberty and justice to all, and deny-
ing both to Negroes.” 12  That legacy of injustice and exclusion would remain a bitter force in 
American life and public policy for generations. 
 Early Supreme Court Opinions Support Slavery and Send Terrible Messages 
to African Americans 
 One of the fi rst policies that fl owed from these fl aws came when Congress implemented 
Article IV, §2 with the Fugitive Slave Act of 1793. 13  Some offi cials had tried to support 
escaped slaves by making it diffi cult for those who purported to own the slaves to take cus-
tody of them. Congress adopted the legislation to make it clearer how slave owners were 
to legally reclaim an escaped slave. Even so, states with strong abolitionist movements, like 
Pennsylvania, maintained state policies intended to make it diffi cult to take those then living 
in a free state back into slavery. 
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 Prigg v. Pennsylvania 
 41 U.S. 539 (1842) 
 INTRODUCTION:  In 1780 the state had enacted a law entitled “An act for the 
gradual abolition of slavery,” which was amended in 1788. Pennsylvania’s legislation 
placed burdens on those who wanted to assert that someone living in the state was a 
runaway slave so that he or she could be returned to another state, sometimes known 
as “personal liberty laws.” 14  To counter these actions, Congress adopted the Fugitive 
Slave Act in 1793. 
 In 1826 Pennsylvania enacted a statute making it a felony to remove a person for 
the purposes of putting them into slavery. 
 In April 1837 Edward Prigg and an accomplice were tried for kidnapping a former 
slave, Margaret Morgan, and her children from Pennsylvania and delivering them in 
Maryland to the heir of her previous owner, one Margaret Ashmore. Morgan had been 
in Pennsylvania for some fi ve years by that point. Prigg had previously been refused an 
order by a magistrate to enforce the federal fugitive slave law against Morgan under 
state statutes. Prigg was found guilty of kidnapping, but he challenged the state law in 
light of the Fugitive Slave Act and Article IV, §2 of the Constitution. 
 Justice Story wrote the opinion for the Court.
 [Prigg has] contended that the statute of Pennsylvania is unconstitutional; fi rst, 
because Congress has the exclusive power of legislation upon the subject-matter 
under the Constitution of the United States, and under the act of the 12th of 
February, 1793 … which was passed in pursuance thereof; secondly, that if  this 
power is not exclusive in Congress, still the concurrent power of the state legisla-
tures is suspended by the actual exercise of the power by Congress; and thirdly, 
that if  not suspended, still the statute of Pennsylvania … is in direct collision with 
the act of Congress, and therefore is unconstitutional and void…. 
 … [Art. IV, Section 2 of the Constitution provides:] “No person held to service 
or labour in one state under the laws thereof, escaping into another, shall in con-
sequence of any law or regulation therein, be discharged from such service or 
labour; but shall be delivered up, on claim of the party to whom such service 
or labour may be due.” The … object of this clause was to secure to the citizens 
of the slaveholding states the complete right and title of ownership in their slaves, 
as property, in every state in the Union into which they might escape…. The full 
recognition of this right and title was indispensable to the security of this species 
of property in all the slaveholding states; and, indeed, was so vital to the preserva-
tion of their domestic interests and institutions, that it cannot be doubted that it 
constituted a fundamental article, without the adoption of which the Union could 
not have been formed. Its true design was to guard against the doctrines and prin-
ciples prevalent in the non-slaveholding states, by preventing them from intermed-
dling with, or obstructing, or abolishing the rights of the owners of slaves. 
 [I] f  the Constitution had not contained this clause, every non-slave-holding state 
in the Union would have been at liberty to have declared free all runaway slaves 
coming within its limits, and to have given them entire immunity and protection 
against the claims of their masters; a course which would have … engendered 
perpetual strife between the different states. The clause was, therefore, of the last 
importance to the safety and security of the southern states…. The clause was 
accordingly adopted into the Constitution by the unanimous consent of the fram-
ers of it; a proof at once of its intrinsic and practical necessity…. 
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 The clause manifestly contemplates the existence of a positive, unqualifi ed right 
on the part of the owner of the slave, which no state law or regulation can in any 
way qualify, regulate, control, or restrain. The slave is not to be discharged from 
service or labour, in consequence of any state law or regulation…. [T] he owner 
must, therefore, have the right to seize and repossess the slave, which the local laws 
of his own state confer upon him as property…. Upon this ground we have not 
the slightest hesitation in holding, that, under and in virtue of the Constitution, 
the owner of a slave is clothed with entire authority, in every state in the Union, 
to seize and recapture his slave, whenever he can do it without any breach of the 
peace, or any illegal violence…. 
 But the clause of the Constitution does not stop here…. Many cases must arise in 
which, if  the remedy of the owner were confi ned to the mere right of seizure and 
recaption, he would be utterly without any adequate redress. He may not be able 
to lay his hands upon the slave. He may not be able to enforce his rights against 
persons who either secrete or conceal, or withhold the slave. He may be restricted 
by local legislation as to the mode of proofs of his ownership; as to the Courts in 
which he shall sue, and as to the actions which he may bring; or the process he may 
use to compel the delivery of the slave. Nay, the local legislation may be utterly 
inadequate to furnish the appropriate redress, … leaving the owner … not that 
right which the Constitution designed to secure—a specifi c delivery and reposses-
sion of the slave, but a mere remedy in damages; and that perhaps against persons 
utterly insolvent or worthless…. 
 And this leads us to the consideration of the other part of the clause, which implies 
at once a guaranty and duty. It says, “But he (the slave) shall be delivered up on 
claim of the party to whom such service or labour may be due.”…. If, indeed, the 
Constitution guarantees the right, and if  it requires the delivery upon the claim 
of the owner … the natural inference certainly is, that the national government is 
clothed with the appropriate authority … to enforce it…. 
 Congress, then, may [give] effect to that right [and] prescribe the mode and extent 
in which it shall be applied…. [T] he act of the 12th of February, 1793 … which … 
provide[s], that when a person held to labour or service in any of the United 
States, shall escape into any other of the states or territories, the person to whom 
such labour or service may be due, his agent or attorney, is hereby empowered to 
seize or arrest such fugitive from labour, and take him or her before any judge of 
the Circuit or District Courts of the United States, residing or being within the 
state, or before any magistrate of a county, city, or town corporate, wherein such 
seizure or arrest shall be made; and upon proof to the satisfaction of such judge 
or magistrate … that the person so seized or arrested, doth, under the laws of the 
state or territory from which he or she fl ed, owe service or labour to the person 
claiming him or her, it shall be the duty of such judge or magistrate, to give a 
certifi cate thereof of such claimant, his agent or attorney, which shall be suffi cient 
warrant for removing the said fugitive from labour, to the state or territory from 
which he or she fl ed. The fourth section provides a penalty against any person 
who shall knowingly and willingly obstruct or hinder such claimant, his agent, or 
attorney, in so seizing or arresting such fugitive from labour, or rescue such fugi-
tive from the claimant, or his agent, or attorney when so arrested, or who shall 
harbour or conceal such fugitive after notice that he is such; and it also saves to 
the person claiming such labour or service, his right of action for or on account 
of such injuries. 
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 Prigg v. Pennsylvania 
 41 U.S. 539 (1842) 
 INTRODUCTION:  In 1780 the state had enacted a law entitled “An act for the 
gradual abolition of slavery,” which was amended in 1788. Pennsylvania’s legislation 
placed burdens on those who wanted to assert that someone living in the state was a 
runaway slave so that he or she could be returned to another state, sometimes known 
as “personal liberty laws.” 14  To counter these actions, Congress adopted the Fugitive 
Slave Act in 1793. 
 In 1826 Pennsylvania enacted a statute making it a felony to remove a person for 
the purposes of putting them into slavery. 
 In April 1837 Edward Prigg and an accomplice were tried for kidnapping a former 
slave, Margaret Morgan, and her children from Pennsylvania and delivering them in 
Maryland to the heir of her previous owner, one Margaret Ashmore. Morgan had been 
in Pennsylvania for some fi ve years by that point. Prigg had previously been refused an 
order by a magistrate to enforce the federal fugitive slave law against Morgan under 
state statutes. Prigg was found guilty of kidnapping, but he challenged the state law in 
light of the Fugitive Slave Act and Article IV, §2 of the Constitution. 
 Justice Story wrote the opinion for the Court.
 [Prigg has] contended that the statute of Pennsylvania is unconstitutional; fi rst, 
because Congress has the exclusive power of legislation upon the subject-matter 
under the Constitution of the United States, and under the act of the 12th of 
February, 1793 … which was passed in pursuance thereof; secondly, that if  this 
power is not exclusive in Congress, still the concurrent power of the state legisla-
tures is suspended by the actual exercise of the power by Congress; and thirdly, 
that if  not suspended, still the statute of Pennsylvania … is in direct collision with 
the act of Congress, and therefore is unconstitutional and void…. 
 … [Art. IV, Section 2 of the Constitution provides:] “No person held to service 
or labour in one state under the laws thereof, escaping into another, shall in con-
sequence of any law or regulation therein, be discharged from such service or 
labour; but shall be delivered up, on claim of the party to whom such service 
or labour may be due.” The … object of this clause was to secure to the citizens 
of the slaveholding states the complete right and title of ownership in their slaves, 
as property, in every state in the Union into which they might escape…. The full 
recognition of this right and title was indispensable to the security of this species 
of property in all the slaveholding states; and, indeed, was so vital to the preserva-
tion of their domestic interests and institutions, that it cannot be doubted that it 
constituted a fundamental article, without the adoption of which the Union could 
not have been formed. Its true design was to guard against the doctrines and prin-
ciples prevalent in the non-slaveholding states, by preventing them from intermed-
dling with, or obstructing, or abolishing the rights of the owners of slaves. 
 [I] f  the Constitution had not contained this clause, every non-slave-holding state 
in the Union would have been at liberty to have declared free all runaway slaves 
coming within its limits, and to have given them entire immunity and protection 
against the claims of their masters; a course which would have … engendered 
perpetual strife between the different states. The clause was, therefore, of the last 
importance to the safety and security of the southern states…. The clause was 
accordingly adopted into the Constitution by the unanimous consent of the fram-
ers of it; a proof at once of its intrinsic and practical necessity…. 
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 The clause manifestly contemplates the existence of a positive, unqualifi ed right 
on the part of the owner of the slave, which no state law or regulation can in any 
way qualify, regulate, control, or restrain. The slave is not to be discharged from 
service or labour, in consequence of any state law or regulation…. [T] he owner 
must, therefore, have the right to seize and repossess the slave, which the local laws 
of his own state confer upon him as property…. Upon this ground we have not 
the slightest hesitation in holding, that, under and in virtue of the Constitution, 
the owner of a slave is clothed with entire authority, in every state in the Union, 
to seize and recapture his slave, whenever he can do it without any breach of the 
peace, or any illegal violence…. 
 But the clause of the Constitution does not stop here…. Many cases must arise in 
which, if  the remedy of the owner were confi ned to the mere right of seizure and 
recaption, he would be utterly without any adequate redress. He may not be able 
to lay his hands upon the slave. He may not be able to enforce his rights against 
persons who either secrete or conceal, or withhold the slave. He may be restricted 
by local legislation as to the mode of proofs of his ownership; as to the Courts in 
which he shall sue, and as to the actions which he may bring; or the process he may 
use to compel the delivery of the slave. Nay, the local legislation may be utterly 
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sion of the slave, but a mere remedy in damages; and that perhaps against persons 
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of the owner … the natural inference certainly is, that the national government is 
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 Congress, then, may [give] effect to that right [and] prescribe the mode and extent 
in which it shall be applied…. [T] he act of the 12th of February, 1793 … which … 
provide[s], that when a person held to labour or service in any of the United 
States, shall escape into any other of the states or territories, the person to whom 
such labour or service may be due, his agent or attorney, is hereby empowered to 
seize or arrest such fugitive from labour, and take him or her before any judge of 
the Circuit or District Courts of the United States, residing or being within the 
state, or before any magistrate of a county, city, or town corporate, wherein such 
seizure or arrest shall be made; and upon proof to the satisfaction of such judge 
or magistrate … that the person so seized or arrested, doth, under the laws of the 
state or territory from which he or she fl ed, owe service or labour to the person 
claiming him or her, it shall be the duty of such judge or magistrate, to give a 
certifi cate thereof of such claimant, his agent or attorney, which shall be suffi cient 
warrant for removing the said fugitive from labour, to the state or territory from 
which he or she fl ed. The fourth section provides a penalty against any person 
who shall knowingly and willingly obstruct or hinder such claimant, his agent, or 
attorney, in so seizing or arresting such fugitive from labour, or rescue such fugi-
tive from the claimant, or his agent, or attorney when so arrested, or who shall 
harbour or conceal such fugitive after notice that he is such; and it also saves to 
the person claiming such labour or service, his right of action for or on account 
of such injuries. 
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 [T] his act may be truly said to cover the whole ground of  the Constitution … 
as to fugitive slaves…. If  this be so, then it would seem … that the legislation 
of  Congress, if  constitutional, must supersede all state legislation upon the 
same subject; and by necessary implication prohibit it. For if  Congress have 
a constitutional power to regulate a particular subject, and they do actually 
regulate it in a given manner, … it cannot be that the state legislatures have a 
right to interfere; and … to prescribe additional regulations…. In such a case, 
the legislation of  Congress, in what it does prescribe, manifestly indicates that 
it does not intend that there shall be any farther legislation to act upon the 
subject-matter…. 15  
 But it has been argued, that the act of Congress is unconstitutional, because it 
does not fall within the scope of any of the enumerated powers of legislation 
confi ded to that body…. [T] he argument [is] that although rights are exclusively 
secured by … the national government, yet, unless the power to enforce these 
rights, or to execute these duties can be found among the express powers of leg-
islation enumerated in the Constitution, they remain without any means of giv-
ing them effect by any act of Congress…. Such a limited construction of the 
Constitution has never yet been adopted as correct…. No one has ever supposed 
that Congress could, constitutionally, … enact laws beyond the powers delegated 
to it by the Constitution; but it has, on various occasions, exercised powers which 
were necessary and proper as means to carry into effect rights expressly given, and 
duties expressly enjoined thereby…. 16  We hold the act to be clearly constitutional 
in all its leading provisions…. 
 The remaining question is, whether the power of  legislation upon this subject is 
exclusive in the national government, or concurrent in the states…. In our opin-
ion it is exclusive…. It is scarcely conceivable that the slaveholding states would 
have been satisfi ed with leaving to the legislation of  the non-slaveholding states, a 
power of  regulation … which would … amount to a power to destroy the rights 
of  the owner…. On the other hand, construe the right of  legislation as exclusive 
in Congress, and every evil, and every danger vanishes. The right and the duty are 
then co-extensive and uniform in remedy and operation throughout the whole 
Union. The owner has the same security, and the same remedial justice, and the 
same exemption from state regulation and control, through however many states 
he may pass with his fugitive slave in his possession…. 
 [W] e are by no means to be understood in any manner whatsoever to doubt or to 
interfere with the police power belonging to the states…. We entertain no doubt 
whatsoever, that the states, in virtue of  their general police power, possess full 
jurisdiction to arrest and restrain runaway slaves, and remove them from their 
borders, and otherwise to secure themselves against their depredations and evil 
example, as they certainly may do in cases of  idlers, vagabonds, and paupers…. 
But such regulations can never be permitted to interfere with or to obstruct the 
just rights of  the owner to reclaim his slave, derived from the Constitution of  the 
United States; or with the remedies prescribed by Congress to aid and enforce 
the same. 
 Upon these grounds, we are of opinion that the act of Pennsylvania upon which 
this indictment is founded, is unconstitutional and void. It purports to punish as 
a public offence against that state, the very act of seizing and removing a slave by 
his master, which the Constitution of the United States was designed to justify 
and uphold…. [T] he judgment of the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania upon the 
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special verdict found in the case, ought to have been that the said Edward Prigg 
was not guilty. 17  
 Justice Taney wrote an opinion dissenting in part.
 I concur in the opinion pronounced by the Court, that the law of Pennsylvania … 
is unconstitutional and void…. But … [t] he opinion of the Court decides that the 
power to provide a remedy for this right is vested exclusively in Congress; and that 
all laws upon the subject passed by a state … are null and void; even although they 
were intended, in good faith, to protect the owner in the exercise of his rights of 
property, and do not confl ict in any degree with the act of Congress…. I dissent 
therefore, … from that part of the opinion of the Court which denies the obliga-
tion and the right of the state authorities to protect the master, when he is endeav-
ouring to seize a fugitive from his service, in pursuance of the right given to him 
by the Constitution of the United States. 18  
 Justice McLean dissenting in part.
 … The slave, as a sensible and human being, is subject to the local authority into 
whatsoever jurisdiction he may go. He is answerable under the laws for his acts, 
and he may claim their protection…. Being within the jurisdiction of a state, a 
slave bears a very different relation to it from that of mere property. 
 … The act of 1793 authorizes a forcible seizure of the slave by the master, not 
to take him out of the state, but to take him before some judicial offi cer within 
it. The act of Pennsylvania punishes a forcible removal of a coloured person out 
of the state. Now, here is no confl ict between the law of the state and the law of 
Congress…. 
 It is very clear that no power to seize and forcibly remove the slave without claim 
is given by the act of Congress…. The slave is found in a state where every man, 
black or white, is presumed to be free; and this state, to preserve the peace of its 
citizens, and its soil and jurisdiction from acts of violence, has prohibited the for-
cible abduction of persons of colour. Does this law confl ict with the Constitution? 
It clearly does not…. 
 It is a most important police regulation…. The offence consists in the abduction 
of a person of colour. The presumption of the state that the coloured person is 
free may be erroneous in fact; and if  so, there can be no diffi culty in proving it. 
But may not the assertion of the master be erroneous also; and if  so, how is his 
act of force to be remedied? The coloured person is taken, and forcibly conveyed 
beyond the jurisdiction of the state. This force, not being authorized by the act of 
Congress nor by the Constitution, may be prohibited by the state. 
 The fi ght among the states over slavery continued on several fronts, including whether slavery 
would be permitted in states newly admitted to the United States. The Missouri Compromise 
of 1820 was an attempt to address this question. 19  Under its terms, Maine was admitted as a 
free state and Missouri as a slave state, but the territory acquired by the Louisiana purchase 
was to be free. The Supreme Court addressed the Missouri Compromise in a case that would 
forever mark a low point in American history because it not only contributed to the likelihood 
of a civil war as a result of its ruling with respect to the Compromise, but also because of the 
way that it characterized African Americans. The edited version is relatively lengthy because it 
is so important to understand not just the ruling in the case, but the message it sent to African 
Americans—a message, as Justice Marshall made clear, that could never be forgotten. 
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 Dred Scott v. Sandford 
 60 U.S. 393 (1857) 
 INTRODUCTION:  Illinois had been a free state ever since the passage of the 
Northwest Ordinance of 1787. The Missouri Compromise of 1820 established 
Missouri as a slave state, but the territories, later states, west of there that had been 
part of the Louisiana purchase would be free. 
 Dred Scott was a slave owned by Dr. Emerson, a U.S. Army surgeon. Emerson 
took Scott with him when he was reassigned from Missouri to Rock Island, Illinois. 
Some two years after that, Emerson took Scott with him when he was reassigned to 
Fort Snelling in what was then called Upper Louisiana, part of the territory acquired 
in the Louisiana Purchase. While there, Emerson acquired a slave named Harriet who 
married Dred Scott and had two children. In 1838 Emerson took all of them back to 
Missouri and eventually sold the family to Sandford, who was also an Army offi cer. 
 Scott and his family sued in Missouri courts for their freedom and alleged cruelty 
by Mrs. Emerson. In this fi rst round of litigation, the state courts ruled that they were 
free, but that decision was later reversed by the Missouri Supreme Court in 1852. That 
represented a sharp departure from previous rulings in the state that had held that 
slaves in situations like Scott’s were free. 
 Mrs. Emerson sold the Scotts to her brother, who was a resident of New York. 
Scott sued in federal court for their freedom, claiming that, because they had resided 
in Illinois, a free state, and in a part of the Louisiana Purchase territory that was des-
ignated as free under the Missouri Compromise of 1820, they were no longer slaves. 
 Chief Justice Taney wrote the opinion for the Court.
 There are two leading questions presented by the record: 1. Had the Circuit Court 
of the United States jurisdiction to hear and determine the case between these par-
ties? And 2. If  it had jurisdiction, is the judgment it has given erroneous or not?… 
 The question is simply this: Can a negro, whose ancestors were imported into this 
country, and sold as slaves, become a member of the political community formed 
and brought into existence by the Constitution of the United States, and as such 
become entitled to all the rights, and privileges, and immunities, guarantied by 
that instrument to the citizen? One of which rights is the privilege of suing in a 
court of the United States in the cases specifi ed in the Constitution.… 
 The words “people of the United States” and “citizens” … both describe the polit-
ical body who, according to our republican institutions, form the sovereignty, and 
who hold the power and conduct the Government through their representatives. 
They are what we familiarly call the “sovereign people,” and every citizen is one 
of this people, and a constituent member of this sovereignty. The question before 
us is, whether the class of persons described in [this case] compose a portion of 
this people, and are constituent members of this sovereignty? We think they are 
not, and that they are not included, and were not intended to be included, under 
the word “citizens” in the Constitution, and can therefore claim none of the rights 
and privileges which that instrument provides for and secures to citizens of the 
United States. On the contrary, they were at that time considered as a subordi-
nate and inferior class of beings, who had been subjugated by the dominant race, 
and … had no rights or privileges but such as those who held the power and the 
Government might choose to grant them.… 
 The question then arises, whether the provisions of the Constitution, in relation 
to the personal rights and privileges to which the citizen of a State should be 
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entitled, embraced the negro African race…? Does the Constitution of the United 
States act upon him whenever he shall be made free under the laws of a State, 
and raised there to the rank of a citizen, and immediately clothe him with all the 
privileges of a citizen in every other State, and in its own courts? The court think 
the affi rmative of these propositions cannot be maintained. And if  it cannot, the 
plaintiff  … could not be a citizen of the State of Missouri, within the meaning of 
the Constitution of the United States, and, consequently, was not entitled to sue 
in its courts. 
 [All persons] … who were at the time of the adoption of the Constitution rec-
ognized as citizens in the several States, became also citizens of this new politi-
cal body; but none other…. [T] he legislation and histories of the times, and the 
language used in the Declaration of Independence, show, that neither the class of 
persons who had been imported as slaves, nor their descendants, whether they had 
become free or not, were then acknowledged as a part of the people, nor intended 
to be included in the general words used in that memorable instrument. 
 They had for more than a century before been regarded as beings of an inferior 
order, and altogether unfi t to associate with the white race, either in social or politi-
cal relations; and so far inferior, that they had no rights which the white man was 
bound to respect; and that the negro might justly and lawfully be reduced to slav-
ery for his benefi t. He was bought and sold, and treated as an ordinary article of 
merchandise and traffi c, whenever a profi t could be made by it. This opinion was 
at that time fi xed and universal in the civilized portion of the white race. It was 
regarded as an axiom in morals as well as in politics … without doubting for a 
moment the correctness of this opinion. 
 And in no nation was this opinion more fi rmly fi xed or more uniformly acted 
upon than by the English…. They not only seized them on the coast of Africa, 
and sold them or held them in slavery for their own use; but they took them as 
ordinary articles of merchandise to every country where they could make a profi t 
on them, and were far more extensively engaged in this commerce than any other 
nation in the world. 
 The opinion thus entertained and acted upon in England was naturally impressed 
upon the colonies they founded on this side of the Atlantic. And, accordingly, a 
negro of the African race was regarded by them as an article of property, and held, 
and bought and sold as such, in every one of the thirteen colonies which united 
in the Declaration of Independence, and afterwards formed the Constitution of 
the United States.… 
 The legislation of the different colonies furnishes positive and indisputable proof 
of this fact.… The province of Maryland [for example], in 1717, … passed a law 
declaring “that if  any free negro or mulatto intermarry with any white woman, or 
if  any white man shall intermarry with any negro or mulatto woman, such negro 
or mulatto shall become a slave during life, excepting mulattoes born of white 
women, who, for such intermarriage, shall only become servants for seven years, 
to be disposed of as the justices of the county court, where such marriage so hap-
pens, shall think fi t; to be applied by them towards the support of a public school 
within the said county. And any white man or white woman who shall intermarry 
as aforesaid, with any negro or mulatto, such white man or white woman shall 
become servants during the term of seven years, and shall be disposed of by the 
justices as aforesaid, and be applied to the uses aforesaid.” [T] he other colonial 
law to which we refer was passed by Massachusetts in 1705 … is entitled “An act 
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that instrument to the citizen? One of which rights is the privilege of suing in a 
court of the United States in the cases specifi ed in the Constitution.… 
 The words “people of the United States” and “citizens” … both describe the polit-
ical body who, according to our republican institutions, form the sovereignty, and 
who hold the power and conduct the Government through their representatives. 
They are what we familiarly call the “sovereign people,” and every citizen is one 
of this people, and a constituent member of this sovereignty. The question before 
us is, whether the class of persons described in [this case] compose a portion of 
this people, and are constituent members of this sovereignty? We think they are 
not, and that they are not included, and were not intended to be included, under 
the word “citizens” in the Constitution, and can therefore claim none of the rights 
and privileges which that instrument provides for and secures to citizens of the 
United States. On the contrary, they were at that time considered as a subordi-
nate and inferior class of beings, who had been subjugated by the dominant race, 
and … had no rights or privileges but such as those who held the power and the 
Government might choose to grant them.… 
 The question then arises, whether the provisions of the Constitution, in relation 
to the personal rights and privileges to which the citizen of a State should be 
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entitled, embraced the negro African race…? Does the Constitution of the United 
States act upon him whenever he shall be made free under the laws of a State, 
and raised there to the rank of a citizen, and immediately clothe him with all the 
privileges of a citizen in every other State, and in its own courts? The court think 
the affi rmative of these propositions cannot be maintained. And if  it cannot, the 
plaintiff  … could not be a citizen of the State of Missouri, within the meaning of 
the Constitution of the United States, and, consequently, was not entitled to sue 
in its courts. 
 [All persons] … who were at the time of the adoption of the Constitution rec-
ognized as citizens in the several States, became also citizens of this new politi-
cal body; but none other…. [T] he legislation and histories of the times, and the 
language used in the Declaration of Independence, show, that neither the class of 
persons who had been imported as slaves, nor their descendants, whether they had 
become free or not, were then acknowledged as a part of the people, nor intended 
to be included in the general words used in that memorable instrument. 
 They had for more than a century before been regarded as beings of an inferior 
order, and altogether unfi t to associate with the white race, either in social or politi-
cal relations; and so far inferior, that they had no rights which the white man was 
bound to respect; and that the negro might justly and lawfully be reduced to slav-
ery for his benefi t. He was bought and sold, and treated as an ordinary article of 
merchandise and traffi c, whenever a profi t could be made by it. This opinion was 
at that time fi xed and universal in the civilized portion of the white race. It was 
regarded as an axiom in morals as well as in politics … without doubting for a 
moment the correctness of this opinion. 
 And in no nation was this opinion more fi rmly fi xed or more uniformly acted 
upon than by the English…. They not only seized them on the coast of Africa, 
and sold them or held them in slavery for their own use; but they took them as 
ordinary articles of merchandise to every country where they could make a profi t 
on them, and were far more extensively engaged in this commerce than any other 
nation in the world. 
 The opinion thus entertained and acted upon in England was naturally impressed 
upon the colonies they founded on this side of the Atlantic. And, accordingly, a 
negro of the African race was regarded by them as an article of property, and held, 
and bought and sold as such, in every one of the thirteen colonies which united 
in the Declaration of Independence, and afterwards formed the Constitution of 
the United States.… 
 The legislation of the different colonies furnishes positive and indisputable proof 
of this fact.… The province of Maryland [for example], in 1717, … passed a law 
declaring “that if  any free negro or mulatto intermarry with any white woman, or 
if  any white man shall intermarry with any negro or mulatto woman, such negro 
or mulatto shall become a slave during life, excepting mulattoes born of white 
women, who, for such intermarriage, shall only become servants for seven years, 
to be disposed of as the justices of the county court, where such marriage so hap-
pens, shall think fi t; to be applied by them towards the support of a public school 
within the said county. And any white man or white woman who shall intermarry 
as aforesaid, with any negro or mulatto, such white man or white woman shall 
become servants during the term of seven years, and shall be disposed of by the 
justices as aforesaid, and be applied to the uses aforesaid.” [T] he other colonial 
law to which we refer was passed by Massachusetts in 1705 … is entitled “An act 
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for the better preventing of a spurious and mixed issue,” &c.; and it provides, that 
“if  any negro or mulatto shall presume to smite or strike any person of the English 
or other Christian nation, such negro or mulatto shall be severely whipped, at the 
discretion of the justices before whom the offender shall be convicted.”… 
 [T] hese laws … show, too plainly to be misunderstood, the degraded condition of 
this unhappy race. They were still in force when the Revolution began, and are a 
faithful index to the state of feeling towards the class of persons of whom they 
speak, and of the position they occupied throughout the thirteen colonies, in the 
eyes and thoughts of the men who framed the Declaration of Independence and 
established the State Constitutions and Governments. They show that a perpetual 
and impassable barrier was intended to be erected between the white race and the 
one which they had reduced to slavery, and governed as subjects with absolute 
and despotic power, and which they then looked upon as so far below them in the 
scale of created beings, that intermarriages between white persons and negroes or 
mulattoes were regarded as unnatural and immoral, and punished as crimes, not 
only in the parties, but in the person who joined them in marriage.… [N]o distinc-
tion … was made between the free negro or mulatto and the slave, but this stigma, 
of the deepest degradation, was fi xed upon the whole race.… 
 Yet the men who framed this [Declaration of Independence] were great men…. 
They perfectly understood the meaning of the language they used, and how it 
would be understood by others; and they knew that it would not in any part of 
the civilized world be supposed to embrace the negro race, which, by common 
consent, had been excluded from civilized Governments and the family of nations, 
and doomed to slavery.… The unhappy black race were separated from the white 
… and were never thought of or spoken of except as property…. 
 This state of public opinion had undergone no change when the Constitution was 
adopted, as is equally evident from its provisions and language.… [T] here are two 
clauses in the Constitution which point directly and specifi cally to the negro race 
as a separate class of persons, and show clearly that they were not regarded as a 
portion of the people or citizens of the Government then formed. One of these 
clauses reserves to each of the thirteen States the right to import slaves until the 
year 1808, if  it thinks proper.… And by the other provision the States pledge 
themselves to each other to maintain the right of property of the master, by deliv-
ering up to him any slave who may have escaped from his service, and be found 
within their respective territories.… 
 It is very true, that in that portion of the Union where the labor of the negro race 
was found to be unsuited to the climate and unprofi table to the master, but few 
slaves were held at the time of the Declaration of Independence; and when the 
Constitution was adopted, it had entirely worn out in one of them, and measures 
had been taken for its gradual abolition in several others. But this change had not 
been produced by any change of opinion in relation to this race … for some of the 
States, where it had ceased … were actively engaged in the slave trade, procuring 
cargoes on the coast of Africa, and transporting them for sale to those parts of 
the Union where their labor was found to be profi table, and suited to the climate 
and productions. And this traffi c was openly carried on, and fortunes accumu-
lated by it, without reproach from the people of the States where they resided.… 
 And we may here again refer, in support of this proposition, to the plain and 
unequivocal language of the laws of the several States…. The legislation of the 
States therefore shows … the inferior and subject condition of that race at the 
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time the Constitution was adopted, and long afterwards…. It cannot be supposed 
that they intended to secure to them rights, and privileges, and rank, in the new 
political body throughout the Union, which every one of them denied within the 
limits of its own dominion.… 
 The right of naturalization was … granted to Congress to establish an [ sic ] uni-
form rule of naturalization is … confi ned to persons born in a foreign country, 
under a foreign Government. It is not a power to raise to the rank of a citizen any 
one born in the United States, who, from birth or parentage, by the laws of the 
country, belongs to an inferior and subordinate class.… Congress might … have 
authorized the naturalization of Indians, because they were aliens and foreign-
ers. But, in their then untutored and savage state no one would have thought of 
admitting them as citizens in a civilized community.… Neither was it used with 
any reference to the African race imported into or born in this country; because 
Congress had no power to naturalize them…. 
 Undoubtedly, a person may be a citizen, … although he exercises no share of the 
political power, and is incapacitated from holding particular offi ces. Women and 
minors, who form a part of the political family, cannot vote; and when a property 
qualifi cation is required to vote or hold a particular offi ce, those who have not 
the necessary qualifi cation cannot vote or hold the offi ce, yet they are citizens.… 
[I] n some of the States of the Union foreigners not naturalized are allowed to vote. 
And the State may give the right to free negroes and mulattoes, but that does not 
make them citizens of the State, and still less of the United States.… 
 The only two provisions [of the Constitution] which point to them and include 
them, treat them as property, and make it the duty of the Government to protect 
it…. The Government of the United States had no right to interfere for any other 
purpose but that of protecting the rights of the owner, leaving it altogether with 
the several States to deal with this race, whether emancipated or not, as each State 
may think justice, humanity, and the interests and safety of society, require.… 
 Dred Scott was not a citizen of Missouri within the meaning of the Constitution 
of the United States, and not entitled as such to sue in its courts; and, conse-
quently, that the Circuit Court had no jurisdiction of the case, and that the judg-
ment on the plea in abatement is erroneous.… 
 We proceed, therefore, to inquire whether the facts relied on by the plaintiff  enti-
tled him to his freedom.… [T] wo questions arise:  1.  Was he, together with his 
family, free in Missouri by reason of the stay in the territory of the United States 
hereinbefore mentioned? And 2.  If  they were not, is Scott himself  free by rea-
son of his removal to Rock Island, in the State of Illinois, as stated in the above 
admissions?… 
 The [Missouri Compromise], upon which the plaintiff  relies, declares that slav-
ery and involuntary servitude, except as a punishment for crime, shall be forever 
prohibited in all that part of the territory ceded by France, under the name of 
Louisiana, which lies north of thirty-six degrees thirty minutes north latitude, and 
not included within the limits of Missouri. And the diffi culty which meets us at 
the threshold of this part of the inquiry is, whether Congress was authorized to 
pass this law under any of the powers granted to it by the Constitution…. 
 The counsel for the plaintiff  has laid much stress upon that article in the 
Constitution which confers on Congress the power “to dispose of and make all 
needful rules and regulations respecting the territory or other property belonging 
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and doomed to slavery.… The unhappy black race were separated from the white 
… and were never thought of or spoken of except as property…. 
 This state of public opinion had undergone no change when the Constitution was 
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as a separate class of persons, and show clearly that they were not regarded as a 
portion of the people or citizens of the Government then formed. One of these 
clauses reserves to each of the thirteen States the right to import slaves until the 
year 1808, if  it thinks proper.… And by the other provision the States pledge 
themselves to each other to maintain the right of property of the master, by deliv-
ering up to him any slave who may have escaped from his service, and be found 
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time the Constitution was adopted, and long afterwards…. It cannot be supposed 
that they intended to secure to them rights, and privileges, and rank, in the new 
political body throughout the Union, which every one of them denied within the 
limits of its own dominion.… 
 The right of naturalization was … granted to Congress to establish an [ sic ] uni-
form rule of naturalization is … confi ned to persons born in a foreign country, 
under a foreign Government. It is not a power to raise to the rank of a citizen any 
one born in the United States, who, from birth or parentage, by the laws of the 
country, belongs to an inferior and subordinate class.… Congress might … have 
authorized the naturalization of Indians, because they were aliens and foreign-
ers. But, in their then untutored and savage state no one would have thought of 
admitting them as citizens in a civilized community.… Neither was it used with 
any reference to the African race imported into or born in this country; because 
Congress had no power to naturalize them…. 
 Undoubtedly, a person may be a citizen, … although he exercises no share of the 
political power, and is incapacitated from holding particular offi ces. Women and 
minors, who form a part of the political family, cannot vote; and when a property 
qualifi cation is required to vote or hold a particular offi ce, those who have not 
the necessary qualifi cation cannot vote or hold the offi ce, yet they are citizens.… 
[I] n some of the States of the Union foreigners not naturalized are allowed to vote. 
And the State may give the right to free negroes and mulattoes, but that does not 
make them citizens of the State, and still less of the United States.… 
 The only two provisions [of the Constitution] which point to them and include 
them, treat them as property, and make it the duty of the Government to protect 
it…. The Government of the United States had no right to interfere for any other 
purpose but that of protecting the rights of the owner, leaving it altogether with 
the several States to deal with this race, whether emancipated or not, as each State 
may think justice, humanity, and the interests and safety of society, require.… 
 Dred Scott was not a citizen of Missouri within the meaning of the Constitution 
of the United States, and not entitled as such to sue in its courts; and, conse-
quently, that the Circuit Court had no jurisdiction of the case, and that the judg-
ment on the plea in abatement is erroneous.… 
 We proceed, therefore, to inquire whether the facts relied on by the plaintiff  enti-
tled him to his freedom.… [T] wo questions arise:  1.  Was he, together with his 
family, free in Missouri by reason of the stay in the territory of the United States 
hereinbefore mentioned? And 2.  If  they were not, is Scott himself  free by rea-
son of his removal to Rock Island, in the State of Illinois, as stated in the above 
admissions?… 
 The [Missouri Compromise], upon which the plaintiff  relies, declares that slav-
ery and involuntary servitude, except as a punishment for crime, shall be forever 
prohibited in all that part of the territory ceded by France, under the name of 
Louisiana, which lies north of thirty-six degrees thirty minutes north latitude, and 
not included within the limits of Missouri. And the diffi culty which meets us at 
the threshold of this part of the inquiry is, whether Congress was authorized to 
pass this law under any of the powers granted to it by the Constitution…. 
 The counsel for the plaintiff  has laid much stress upon that article in the 
Constitution which confers on Congress the power “to dispose of and make all 
needful rules and regulations respecting the territory or other property belonging 
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to the United States;” 20  but, in the judgement of the court, that provision had no 
bearing on the present controversy, and the power there given, whatever it may be, 
is confi ned, and was intended to be confi ned, to … the particular territory [ceded 
by Virginia], and cannot, by any just rule of interpretation, be extended to terri-
tory which the new Government might afterwards obtain from a foreign nation…. 
 There is certainly no power given by the Constitution to the Federal Government 
to establish or maintain colonies bordering on the United States or at a distance, 
to be ruled and governed at its own pleasure; nor to enlarge its territorial limits 
in any way, except by the admission of new States.… The power to expand the 
territory of the United States by the admission of new States is plainly given…. 
[T] here is no express regulation in the Constitution defi ning the power which the 
General Government may exercise over the person or property of a citizen in a 
Territory thus acquired…. And when the Territory becomes a part of the United 
States, the Federal Government [takes over] with its powers over the citizen strictly 
defi ned, and limited by the Constitution…. [T]he Federal Government can exer-
cise no power over his person or property, beyond what that instrument confers, 
nor lawfully deny any right which it has reserved.… 
 These powers, and others, in relation to rights of person, which it is not neces-
sary here to enumerate, are, in express and positive terms, denied to the General 
Government; and the rights of private property have been guarded with equal 
care. Thus the rights of property are united with the rights of person, and placed 
on the same ground by the fi fth amendment to the Constitution, which provides 
that no person shall be deprived of life, liberty, and property, without due process 
of law. And an act of Congress which deprives a citizen of the United States of 
his liberty or property, merely because he came himself  or brought his property 
into a particular Territory of the United States … could hardly be dignifi ed with 
the name of due process of law. And if  the Constitution recognizes the right of 
property of the master in a slave, … no tribunal, acting under the authority of the 
United States, whether it be legislative, executive, or judicial, has a right to draw 
such a distinction, or deny to it the benefi t of the provisions and guarantees which 
have been provided for the protection of private property against the encroach-
ments of the Government. 
 [T] he right of property in a slave is distinctly and expressly affi rmed in the 
Constitution.… Upon these considerations, it is the opinion of the court that the 
act of Congress which prohibited a citizen from holding and owning property of 
this kind in the territory of the United States north of the line therein mentioned, 
is not warranted by the Constitution, and is therefore void; and that neither Dred 
Scott himself, nor any of his family, were made free by being carried into this 
territory…. 
 But … it is contended, on the part of the plaintiff, that he is made free by being 
taken to Rock Island, in the State of Illinois, … and being so made free, he was 
not again reduced to a state of slavery by being brought back to Missouri.… [In] 
the case of  Strader et al. v. Graham … slaves had been taken from Kentucky to 
Ohio, with the consent of the owner, and afterwards brought back to Kentucky. 
And this court held that their status or condition, as free or slave, depended upon 
the laws of Kentucky, when they were brought back into that State…. As Scott 
was a slave when taken into the State of Illinois by his owner, and was there held 
as such, and brought back in that character, his status, as free or slave, depended 
on the laws of Missouri, and not of Illinois. 
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 It has, however, been urged in the argument, that by the laws of Missouri he was 
free on his return…. [W] e are satisfi ed … that Scott and his family upon their 
return were not free, but were, by the laws of Missouri, the property of the defend-
ant; and that the Circuit Court of the United States had no jurisdiction [since] the 
plaintiff  was a slave, and not a citizen.… 21  
 Justice McLean wrote a dissenting opinion.
 There is no [basis in this case] which shows … an inability in the plaintiff  to sue 
in the Circuit Court. It does not allege that the plaintiff  had his domicil in any 
other State, nor that he is not a free man in Missouri. He is averred to have had a 
negro ancestry, but this does not show that he is not a citizen of  Missouri, within 
the meaning of  the act of  Congress authorizing him to sue in the Circuit Court. 
It has never been held necessary, to constitute a citizen within the act, that he 
should have the qualifi cations of  an elector. Females and minors may sue in the 
Federal courts, and so may any individual who has a permanent domicil in the 
State under whose laws his rights are protected, and to which he owes allegiance. 
 Being born under our Constitution and laws, no naturalization is required, as one 
of foreign birth, to make him a citizen. The most general and appropriate defi ni-
tion of the term citizen is “a freeman.” Being a freeman, and having his domicil 
in a State different from that of the defendant, he is a citizen within the act of 
Congress, and the courts of the Union are open to him.… 
 In the argument, it was said that a colored citizen would not be an agreeable mem-
ber of society. This is more a matter of taste than of law. Several of the States have 
admitted persons of color to the right of suffrage, and in this view have recognized 
them as citizens; and this has been done in the slave as well as the free States. On 
the question of citizenship, it must be admitted that we have not been very fas-
tidious. Under the late treaty with Mexico, we have made citizens of all grades, 
combinations, and colors. The same was done in the admission of Louisiana and 
Florida. No one ever doubted, and no court ever held, that the people of these 
Territories did not become citizens under the treaty. They have exercised all the 
rights of citizens, without being naturalized under the acts of Congress.… 
 We need not refer to the mercenary spirit which introduced the infamous traffi c 
in slaves, to show the degradation of  negro slavery in our country. This system 
was imposed upon our colonial settlements by the mother country, and it is due 
to truth to say that the commercial colonies and States were chiefl y engaged in 
the traffi c.… 
 I prefer the lights of Madison, Hamilton, and Jay, as a means of construing the 
Constitution in all its bearings, rather than to look behind that period, into a 
traffi c which is now declared to be piracy, and punished with death by Christian 
nations. I do not like to draw the sources of our domestic relations from so dark a 
ground. Our independence was a great epoch in the history of freedom; and while 
I admit the Government was not made especially for the colored race, yet many of 
them were citizens of the New England States, and exercised the rights of suffrage 
when the Constitution was adopted, and it was not doubted by any intelligent 
person that its tendencies would greatly ameliorate their condition. 
 Many of the States, on the adoption of the Constitution, or shortly afterward, 
took measures to abolish slavery within their respective jurisdictions; and it is 
a well-known fact that a belief  was cherished by the leading men, South as well 
as North, that the institution of slavery would gradually decline, until it would 
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become extinct. The increased value of slave labor, in the culture of cotton and 
sugar, prevented the realization of this expectation. Like all other communities 
and States, the South were infl uenced by … their own interests. 
 But if  we are to turn our attention to the dark ages of the world, why confi ne our 
view to colored slavery? On the same principles, white men were made slaves. All 
slavery has its origin in power, and is against right. 
 The power of  Congress to establish Territorial Governments, and to prohibit the 
introduction of  slavery therein, is the next point to be considered.… On the 13th 
of  July, the Ordinance of  1787 was passed, “for the government of  the United 
States territory northwest of  the river Ohio,” with but one dissenting vote. This 
instrument provided there should be organized in the territory not less than three 
nor more than fi ve States, designating their boundaries. It was passed while the 
Federal Convention was in session, about two months before the Constitution 
was adopted by the Convention.… It provided for a temporary Government, as 
initiatory to the formation of  State Governments. Slavery was prohibited in the 
territory. 
 Can any one suppose that the eminent men of the Federal Convention could 
have overlooked or neglected a matter so vitally important to the country, in the 
organization of temporary Governments for the vast territory northwest of the 
river Ohio? In the 3d section of the 4th article of the Constitution, they did make 
provision for the admission of new States, the sale of the public lands, and the 
temporary Government of the territory. Without a temporary Government, new 
States could not have been formed, nor could the public lands have been sold. 
 … The power to make all needful rules and regulations is a power to legislate.… 
But it is argued that … the rules and regulations of Congress are limited to the 
disposition of lands and other property belonging to the United States. That this 
is not the true construction of the section appears from the fact that in the fi rst 
line of the section “the power to dispose of the public lands” is given expressly, 
and, in addition, to make all needful rules and regulations.… 
 Chief Justice Marshall, speaking for the court, said, in regard to the people of 
Florida, “they do not, however, participate in political power; they do not share 
in the Government till Florida shall become a State; in the mean time, Florida 
continues to be a Territory of the United States, governed by virtue of that clause 
in the Constitution which empowers Congress to make all needful rules and regu-
lations respecting the territory….” 
 … If Congress should deem slaves or free colored persons injurious to the popula-
tion of a free Territory … they have the power to prohibit them from becoming 
settlers in it.… The prohibition of slavery north of thirty-six degrees thirty min-
utes, and of the State of Missouri, contained in the act admitting that State into 
the Union, was passed by a vote of 134, in the House of Representatives, to 42. 
Before Mr. Monroe signed the act, it was submitted by him to his Cabinet, and 
they held the restriction of slavery in a Territory to be within the constitutional 
powers of Congress. It would be singular, if  in 1804 Congress had power to pro-
hibit the introduction of slaves in Orleans Territory from any other part of the 
Union, under the penalty of freedom to the slave, if  the same power, embodied in 
the Missouri compromise, could not be exercised in 1820. 
 … If Congress may establish a Territorial Government in the exercise of its discre-
tion, it is a clear principle that a court cannot control that discretion. This being 
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the case, I do not see on what ground the act is held to be void. It did not purport 
to forfeit property, or take it for public purposes. It only prohibited slavery; in 
doing which, it followed the ordinance of 1787.… 
 In this case, a majority of the court have said that a slave may be taken by his 
master into a Territory of the United States, the same as a horse, or any other kind 
of property.… A slave is not a mere chattel. He bears the impress of his Maker, 
and is amenable to the laws of God and man; and he is destined to an endless 
existence.… Illinois has declared in the most solemn and impressive form that 
there shall be neither slavery nor involuntary servitude in that State, and that any 
slave brought into it, with a view of becoming a resident, shall be emancipated. 
And effect has been given to this provision of the Constitution by the decision 
of the Supreme Court of that State. With a full knowledge of these facts, a slave 
is brought from Missouri to Rock Island, in the State of Illinois, and is retained 
there as a slave for two years, and then taken to Fort Snelling, where slavery is 
prohibited by the Missouri compromise act, and there he is detained two years 
longer in a state of slavery. Harriet, his wife, was also kept at the same place four 
years as a slave…. 
 [A] majority of my brethren have held that on their being returned to Missouri the 
status of slavery attached to them.… I can perceive no reason why the institutions 
of Illinois should not receive the same consideration as those of Missouri.… There 
is no evidence before us that Dred Scott and his family returned to Missouri vol-
untarily.… It would be a mockery of law and an outrage on his rights to coerce his 
return, and then claim that it was voluntary, and on that ground that his former 
status of slavery attached.… The Missouri court disregards the express provisions 
of an act of Congress and the Constitution of a sovereign State, both of which 
laws for twenty-eight years it had not only regarded, but carried into effect.… 
I think the judgment of the court below should be reversed. 
 Justice Curtis wrote a dissent.
 … At the time of the ratifi cation of the Articles of Confederation, all free 
native-born inhabitants of the States of New Hampshire, Massachusetts, New 
York, New Jersey, and North Carolina, though descended from African slaves, 
were not only citizens of those States, but such of them as had the other necessary 
qualifi cations possessed the franchise of electors, on equal terms with other citi-
zens.… These colored persons were not only included in the body of “the people 
of the United States,” by whom the Constitution was ordained and established, 
but in at least fi ve of the States they had the power to act, and doubtless did act, 
by their suffrages, upon the question of its adoption. It would be strange, if  we 
were to fi nd in that instrument anything which deprived of their citizenship any 
part of the people of the United States who were among those by whom it was 
established. 
 I can fi nd nothing in the Constitution which … deprives of their citizenship any 
class of persons who were citizens of the United States at the time of its adoption, 
or who should be native-born citizens of any State after its adoption; nor any 
power enabling Congress to disfranchise persons born on the soil of any State, 
and entitled to citizenship of such State by its Constitution and laws.… 
 I dissent, therefore, from that part of the opinion of the majority of the court, in 
which it is held that a person of African descent cannot be a citizen of the United 
States; and I regret I must go further, and dissent both from what I deem their 
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assumption of authority to examine the constitutionality of the act of Congress 
commonly called the Missouri compromise act, and the grounds and conclusions 
announced in their opinion.… 
 There was to be established by the Constitution a frame of government, under 
which the people of the United States and their posterity were to continue indefi -
nitely. To take one of its provisions, the language of which is broad enough to 
extend throughout the existence of the Government, and embrace all territory 
belonging to the United States throughout all time … and narrow it down to ter-
ritory belonging to the United States when the Constitution was framed … seems 
to me to be an interpretation as inconsistent with the nature and purposes of the 
instrument, as it is with its language, and I can have no hesitation in rejecting it.… 
 But it is insisted, that whatever other powers Congress may have respecting the 
territory of  the United States, the subject of  negro slavery forms an exception. 
The Constitution declares that Congress shall have power to make “all needful 
rules and regulations” respecting the territory belonging to the United States. 
The assertion is, though the Constitution says all, it does not mean all—though 
it says all, without qualifi cation, it means all except such as allow or prohibit 
slavery.… There is nothing in the context which qualifi es the grant of  power.… 
No other clause of  the Constitution has been referred to at the bar, or has been 
seen by me, which imposes any restriction or makes any exception concerning the 
power of  Congress to allow or prohibit slavery in the territory belonging to the 
United States.… 
 For these reasons, I am of opinion that so much of the several acts of Congress as 
prohibited slavery and involuntary servitude within that part of the Territory of 
Wisconsin lying north of thirty-six degrees thirty minutes north latitude, and west 
of the river Mississippi, were constitutional and valid laws. 
 The Civil War Amendments: The Attempt to Establish Foundations for Equality 
 The  Dred Scott ruling contributed to the growing likelihood of  a bloody civil war. During 
that war, of  course, Abraham Lincoln issued the Emancipation Proclamation, which pro-
vided: “That on the fi rst day of  January, in the year of  our Lord one thousand eight hun-
dred and sixty-three, all persons held as slaves within any State or designated part of  a 
State, the people whereof shall then be in rebellion against the United States, shall be then, 
thenceforward, and forever free….” 22  Unfortunately, it purported to free those who were 
not then within the reach of  federal authorities and did not free those slaves who were held 
in other states that were not then in confl ict with the national government. That is not to 
suggest that the proclamation was not profoundly important in symbolic terms and had 
other effects, but it was a long way from a resolution of  the issue of  slavery. A more com-
plete effort to achieve that goal came with the adoption of  the Thirteenth, Fourteenth, and 
Fifteenth Amendments to the U.S. Constitution, often now referred to collectively as the 
Civil War Amendments. 
 The Thirteenth Amendment provided in its fi rst section that: “Neither slavery nor invol-
untary servitude, except as a punishment for crime whereof the party shall have been duly 
convicted, shall exist within the United States, or any place subject to their jurisdiction.” 
The second section added that: “Congress shall have power to enforce this article by appro-
priate legislation.” 
 The Fifteenth Amendment was also brief, providing only that: “The right of citizens of 
the United States to vote shall not be denied or abridged by the United States or by any 
From Slavery to Modern Civil Rights Protection 33
State on account of race, color, or previous condition of servitude.” Like the Thirteenth 
Amendment, this one also ensured that: “Congress shall have power to enforce this article 
by appropriate legislation.” 
 The Fourteenth Amendment, by contrast, was far more complex and comprehensive. 
The fi rst section contained a number of provisions that applied not just to former slaves but 
to all “persons.” 
 All persons born or naturalized in the United States and subject to the jurisdiction 
thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State wherein they reside. No State 
shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citi-
zens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or 
property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the 
equal protection of the laws. 
 The discussion of citizenship at the beginning of the amendment was a direct rejection of 
the ruling in  Dred Scott . The second was also to be a rejection of the statements in Taney’s 
ruling that those with issues about their rights and liberties should look to their states for 
protection. The amendment repeated the language of Article IV that the privileges and 
immunities of American citizens were not to be abridged by the states. Finally, Section 1 
provided for the now familiar due process and equal protection protections against state 
violations. Like the other two Civil War Amendments, it also provided in Section 5 that: 
“The Congress shall have power to enforce, by appropriate legislation, the provisions of this 
article.” 
 The U.S. Supreme Court Limits the Ability of Congress to Redress Civil 
Rights Abuses 
 The post-Civil War reconstruction era was a tumultuous time, but it was clear that Congress 
was going to take action to implement the provisions of the Fourteenth Amendment. 
However, the Supreme Court promptly moved to limit the legislature’s ability to ensure full 
rights for all Americans. It would also move in other ways to block the realization of full 
equality for African Americans, barriers that would last for decades. 
 Two cases in particular quickly limited protections that had seemed to be at hand fol-
lowing the adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment. The fi rst of these was an initial chal-
lenge to the amendment that all but erased any meaningful application of its “privileges and 
immunities” clause. It was known as the  Slaughter-House Cases , because it involved a set of 
challenges by slaughterhouses and meat processing businesses in New Orleans. 
 Slaughter-House Cases 
 83 U.S. 36 (1873) 
 INTRODUCTION: Louisiana enacted a law governing slaughterhouses and meat 
processing facilities in New Orleans as a regulatory policy to protect public health 
and safety. It created a monopoly under the control of a newly created corporation 
to be known as the Crescent City Live-Stock Landing Company. In the process, the 
law ordered the closing of all existing facilities in the city. New Orleans butchers chal-
lenged the law unsuccessfully in state courts. Their appeal to the U.S. Supreme Court 
on all the key provisions of the Thirteenth and Fourteenth Amendments marked the 
Court’s fi rst opinion interpreting those new additions to the Constitution. 
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 Justice Miller wrote the opinion for the Court.
 … This statute is denounced … as creating a monopoly and conferring odious 
and exclusive privileges upon a small number of persons at the expense of the 
great body of the community of New Orleans [and] deprives … the whole of the 
butchers of the city of the right to exercise their trade, the business…; and that 
the unrestricted exercise of the business of butchering is necessary to the daily 
subsistence of the population of the city.… 
 The power here exercised by the legislature of  Louisiana is … one which has been 
… always conceded to belong to the States…. This is called the police power…. 
[T] he authority of the legislature of Louisiana to pass the present statute is ample, 
unless some restraint in the exercise of that power be found in the constitution of 
that State or in the amendments to the Constitution of the United States…. 
 The plaintiffs … allege that the statute … creates an involuntary servitude forbid-
den by the thirteenth article of amendment; That it abridges the privileges and 
immunities of citizens of the United States; That it denies to the plaintiffs the 
equal protection of the laws; and, That it deprives them of their property without 
due process of law; contrary to the provisions of the fi rst section of the fourteenth 
article of amendment. This court is thus called upon for the fi rst time to give 
construction to these articles.… [N] o one can fail to be impressed with the one 
pervading purpose found in them all…; we mean the freedom of the slave race, 
the security and fi rm establishment of that freedom, and the protection of the 
newly made freeman and citizen from the oppressions of those who had formerly 
exercised unlimited dominion over him.… 
 The fi rst section of the fourteenth article … opens with a defi nition of citizenship— 
not only citizenship of the United States, but citizenship of the States.… [I] t had 
been held by this court, in the celebrated  Dred Scott case … that a man of African 
descent, whether a slave or not, was not and could not be a citizen of a State or 
of the United States.… To remove this diffi culty primarily, and to establish a clear 
and comprehensive defi nition of citizenship which should declare what should 
constitute citizenship of the United States, and also citizenship of a State, the 
fi rst clause of the fi rst section was framed. “All persons born or naturalized in the 
United States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United 
States and of the State wherein they reside.”… [It] declares that persons may be 
citizens of the United States without regard to their citizenship of a particular 
State, and it overturns the  Dred Scott decision…. 
 [T] here is a citizenship of  the United States, and a citizenship of  a State, which are 
distinct from each other…. We think this distinction and its explicit recognition 
in this amendment of  great weight in this argument, because the next paragraph 
of  this same section … speaks only of  privileges and immunities of  citizens of 
the United States, and does not speak of  those of  citizens of  the several States.… 
Of the privileges and immunities of  the citizen of  the United States, and of  the 
privileges and immunities of  the citizen of  the State, … it is only the former 
which are placed by this clause under the protection of  the Federal Constitution, 
and that the latter, whatever they may be, are not intended to have any additional 
protection by this paragraph of  the amendment. [T]he latter must rest for their 
security and protection where they have heretofore rested…. [T]he entire domain 
of  the privileges and immunities of  citizens of  the States, as above defi ned, lay 
within the constitutional and legislative power of  the States, and without that of 
the Federal government.… 
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 Having shown that the privileges and immunities relied on in the argument are 
those which belong to citizens of the States as such, and that they are left to the 
State governments for security and protection … we may hold ourselves excused 
from defi ning the privileges and immunities of citizens of the United States which 
no State can abridge, until some case involving those privileges may make it neces-
sary to do so. 
 … Under the pressure of all the excited feeling growing out of the war, our states-
men have still believed that the existence of the States with powers for domestic 
and local government, including the regulation of civil rights—the rights of per-
son and of property—was essential to the perfect working of our complex form 
of government, though they have thought proper to impose additional limitations 
on the States, and to confer additional power on that of the Nation.… The judg-
ments of the Supreme Court of Louisiana in these cases are affi rmed. 
 Justice Field wrote a dissenting opinion, joined by the Chief Justice and Justices 
Swayne and Bradley.
 … The question presented is … one of the gravest importance, not merely to 
the parties here, but to the whole country. It is … whether the recent amend-
ments to the Federal Constitution protect the citizens of the United States against 
the deprivation of their common rights by State legislation. In my judgment the 
fourteenth amendment does afford such protection, and was so intended by the 
Congress which framed and the States which adopted it.… 
 The fi rst clause of this amendment determines who are citizens of the United 
States…. It recognizes in express terms … citizens of the United States, and it 
makes their citizenship dependent upon the place of their birth, or the fact of 
their adoption, and not upon the constitution or laws of any State or the condi-
tion of their ancestry. A citizen of a State is now only a citizen of the United 
States residing in that State. The fundamental rights, privileges, and immunities 
which belong to him as a free man and a free citizen, now belong to him as a 
citizen of the United States, and are not dependent upon his citizenship of any 
State.… They do not derive their existence from its legislation, and cannot be 
destroyed by its power. 
 The amendment … assumes that there are … privileges and immunities which 
belong of  right to citizens as such, and ordains that they shall not be abridged 
by State legislation. If  this inhibition has no reference to privileges and immu-
nities of  this character, but only refers, as held by the majority of  the court in 
their opinion, to such privileges and immunities as were before its adoption spe-
cially designated in the Constitution or necessarily implied as belonging to citi-
zens of  the United States, it was a vain and idle enactment, which accomplished 
nothing…. 
 What, then, are the privileges and immunities which are secured against abridg-
ment by State legislation? In the fi rst section of the Civil Rights Act Congress … 
has there declared that they include the right “to make and enforce contracts, to 
sue, be parties and give evidence, to inherit, purchase, lease, sell, hold, and con-
vey real and personal property, and to full and equal benefi t of all laws and pro-
ceedings for the security of person and property.” That act, it is true, was passed 
before the fourteenth amendment…. Accordingly, after its ratifi cation, Congress 
re-enacted the act under the belief  that whatever doubts may have previously 
existed of its validity, they were removed by the amendment. 
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 Justice Miller wrote the opinion for the Court.
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 The terms, privileges and immunities, are not new in the amendment; they were 
in the Constitution before the amendment was adopted. They are found in the 
second section of  the fourth article…. The privileges and immunities designated 
[there] are those … which of  right belong to the citizens of  all free governments, 
and they can be enjoyed under that clause by the citizens of  each State in the sev-
eral States upon the same terms and conditions as they are enjoyed by the citizens 
of  the latter States.… It will not be pretended that under the fourth article of  the 
Constitution any State could create a monopoly in any known trade or manufac-
ture in favor of  her own citizens, or any portion of  them, which would exclude 
an equal participation in the trade or manufacture monopolized by citizens of 
other States.… 
 The privileges and immunities of citizens of the United States, of every one of 
them, is secured against abridgment in any form by any State. The fourteenth 
amendment places them under the guardianship of the National authority.… This 
equality of right, with exemption from all disparaging and partial enactments, 
in the lawful pursuits of life, throughout the whole country, is the distinguish-
ing privilege of citizens of the United States. To them, everywhere, all pursuits, 
all professions, all avocations are open without other restrictions than such as 
are imposed equally upon all others of the same age, sex, and condition.… The 
fourteenth amendment, in my judgment, makes it essential to the validity of the 
legislation of every State that this equality of right should be respected.… 23  
 Justice Swayne joined the dissents of  Justices Field and Bradley but also wrote a 
separate dissent.
 The thirteenth amendment…, the fourteenth…, and the fi fteenth … mark an 
important epoch in the constitutional history of the country. They trench directly 
upon the power of the States, and deeply affect those bodies.… Fairly construed 
these amendments may be said to rise to the dignity of a new Magna Charta.… 
 The fi rst section of the fourteenth amendment is alone involved in the considera-
tion of these cases. No searching analysis is necessary to [illuminate] its meaning.… 
A citizen of a State is  ipso facto a citizen of the United States.… “The privileges 
and immunities” of a citizen of the United States include, among other things, the 
fundamental rights of life, liberty, and property, and also the rights which pertain 
to him by reason of his membership of the Nation.… 
 The construction adopted by the majority of my brethren is, in my judgment, 
much too narrow. It defeats … the intent of those by whom the instrument was 
framed and of those by whom it was adopted.… By the Constitution, as it stood 
before the war, ample protection was given against oppression by the Union, 
but little was given against wrong and oppression by the States. That want was 
intended to be supplied by this amendment. Against the former this court has been 
called upon more than once to interpose.… But this arm of our jurisdiction is, in 
these cases, stricken down by the judgment just given. Nowhere, than in this court, 
ought the will of the nation, as thus expressed, to be more liberally construed or 
more cordially executed. This determination of the majority seems to me to lie far 
in the other direction. I earnestly hope that the consequences to follow may prove 
less serious and far-reaching than the minority fear they will be. 
 Another major opinion, known as the  Civil Rights Cases , followed and blocked efforts by 
Congress to enact civil rights statutes expected to provide meaningful protection against 
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discrimination in a variety of areas of American life. The constraints imposed by the Court 
in the  Civil Rights Cases have never been reversed, and this precedent has continued to 
present limitations on civil rights efforts in the contemporary era, as Congress has sought 
to use the commerce power under Article I, §8 in order to enact civil rights legislation while 
avoiding the constraints of the 1883  Civil Rights Cases . 
 Civil Rights Cases 
 109 U.S. 3 (1883) 
 INTRODUCTION: This case consolidated several different actions, all of which were 
brought together to test the constitutional validity of the Civil Rights Act of 1875. 
The act provides in part:
 SEC. 1. That all persons within the jurisdiction of the United States shall be enti-
tled to the full and equal enjoyment of the accommodations, advantages, facilities, 
and privileges of inns, public conveyances on land or water, theatres, and other 
places of public amusement; subject only to the conditions and limitations estab-
lished by law, and applicable alike to citizens of every race and color, regardless of 
any previous condition of servitude. 
 SEC. 2. That any person who shall violate the foregoing section by denying to any 
citizen, except for reasons by law applicable to citizens of every race and color, and 
regardless of any previous condition of servitude, the full enjoyment of any of the 
accommodations, advantages, facilities, or privileges in said section enumerated, 
or by aiding or inciting such denial, shall for every such offence forfeit and pay the 
sum of fi ve hundred dollars to the person aggrieved thereby, to be recovered in an 
action of debt, with full costs; and shall also, for every such offence, be deemed 
guilty of a misdemeanor…. 
 States asserted that these provisions represented an intrusion into the powers of the 
state, while defenders focused on the enforcement authority provided by the post-Civil 
War amendments. 
 Justice Bradley wrote the opinion for the Court.
 [I] t is the purpose of the law to declare that, in the enjoyment of the accommo-
dations and privileges of inns, public conveyances, theatres, and other places of 
public amusement, no distinction shall be made between citizens of different race 
or color, or between those who have, and those who have not, been slaves. Its 
effect is to declare, that in all inns, public conveyances, and places of amusement, 
colored citizens, whether formerly slaves or not, and citizens of other races, shall 
have the same accommodations and privileges in all inns, public conveyances, and 
places of amusement as are enjoyed by white citizens; and vice versa. The second 
section makes it a penal offence in any person to deny to any citizen of any race or 
color, regardless of previous servitude, any of the accommodations or privileges 
mentioned in the fi rst section. 
 Has Congress constitutional power to make such a law? … The power is sought, 
fi rst, in the Fourteenth Amendment [which] declares that: “No State shall make 
or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of 
the United States; nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or prop-
erty without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the 
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 [I] t is the purpose of the law to declare that, in the enjoyment of the accommo-
dations and privileges of inns, public conveyances, theatres, and other places of 
public amusement, no distinction shall be made between citizens of different race 
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places of amusement as are enjoyed by white citizens; and vice versa. The second 
section makes it a penal offence in any person to deny to any citizen of any race or 
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mentioned in the fi rst section. 
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erty without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the 
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equal protection of the laws.” It is State action of a particular character that is 
prohibited. Individual invasion of individual rights is not the subject-matter of the 
amendment.… It nullifi es and makes void all State legislation, and State action of 
every kind, which impairs the privileges and immunities of citizens of the United 
States, or which injures them in life, liberty or property without due process of 
law, or which denies to any of them the equal protection of the laws.… [T] he last 
section of the amendment invests Congress with power to enforce it by appro-
priate legislation.… To adopt appropriate legislation for correcting the effects of 
such prohibited State laws and State acts, and thus to render them effectually null, 
void, and innocuous.… It does not invest Congress with power to legislate upon 
subjects which are within the domain of State legislation; but to provide modes of 
relief  against State legislation, or State action, of the kind referred to. It does not 
authorize Congress to create a code of municipal law for the regulation of private 
rights; but to provide modes of redress against the operation of State laws, and 
the action of State offi cers executive or judicial, when these are subversive of the 
fundamental rights specifi ed in the amendment.… 
 [U] ntil some State law has been passed, or some State action through its offi cers 
or agents has been taken, adverse to the rights of citizens sought to be protected 
by the Fourteenth Amendment, no legislation of the United States under said 
amendment, nor any proceeding under such legislation, can be called into activ-
ity…. Of course, legislation may, and should be, provided in advance to meet 
the exigency when it arises; but it should be adapted to the mischief and wrong 
which the amendment was intended to provide against; and that is, State laws, 
or State action of some kind, adverse to the rights of the citizen secured by the 
amendment.… In fi ne, the legislation which Congress is authorized to adopt in 
this behalf  is not general legislation upon the rights of the citizen, but corrective 
legislation, that is, such as may be necessary and proper for counteracting such 
laws as the States may adopt or enforce … or such acts and proceedings as the 
States may commit or take, and which, by the amendment, they are prohibited 
from committing or taking.… 
 An inspection of  [this] law shows that it makes no reference whatever to any 
supposed or apprehended violation of  the Fourteenth Amendment on the part 
of  the States.… It proceeds … to declare that certain acts committed by indi-
viduals shall be deemed offences, and shall be prosecuted and punished by pro-
ceedings in the courts of  the United States. It does not profess to be corrective 
of  any constitutional wrong committed by the States…. In other words, it steps 
into the domain of  local jurisprudence, and lays down rules for the conduct of 
individuals in society towards each other…. 
 [C] ivil rights, such as are guaranteed by the Constitution against State aggression, 
cannot be impaired by the wrongful acts of individuals, unsupported by State 
authority…. The wrongful act of an individual, unsupported by any such author-
ity, is simply a private wrong … and may presumably be vindicated by resort to 
the laws of the State for redress.… Hence, in all those cases where the Constitution 
seeks to protect the rights of the citizen against discriminative and unjust laws of 
the State by prohibiting such laws, it is not individual offences, but abrogation and 
denial of rights, which it denounces, and for which it clothes the Congress with 
power to provide a remedy.… 
 [T] he law in question cannot be sustained by any grant of  legislative power made 
to Congress by the Fourteenth Amendment.… The law in question, without any 
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reference to adverse State legislation on the subject, declares that all persons 
shall be entitled to equal accommodations and privileges of  inns, public convey-
ances, and places of  public amusement, and imposes a penalty upon any indi-
vidual who shall deny to any citizen such equal accommodations and privileges. 
This is not corrective legislation…. What we have to decide is, whether such ple-
nary power has been conferred upon Congress by the Fourteenth Amendment; 
and, in our judgment, it has not. 
 But the power of  Congress … is sought, in the second place, from the Thirteenth 
Amendment, which abolishes slavery.… The only question under the present 
head, therefore, is, whether the refusal to any persons of  the accommodations 
of  an inn, or a public conveyance, or a place of  public amusement, by an indi-
vidual, and without any sanction or support from any State law or regulation, 
does infl ict upon such persons any manner of  servitude, or form of  slavery, as 
those terms are understood in this country? … The Thirteenth Amendment has 
respect, not to distinctions of  race, or class, or color, but to slavery.… 
 Can the act of  a mere individual, the owner of  the inn, the public conveyance or 
place of  amusement, refusing the accommodation, be justly regarded as impos-
ing any badge of  slavery or servitude upon the applicant…? [W] e are forced to 
the conclusion that such an act of  refusal has nothing to do with slavery or invol-
untary servitude, and that if  it is violative of  any right of  the party, his redress 
is to be sought under the laws of  the State…. It would be running the slavery 
argument into the ground to make it apply to every act of  discrimination which 
a person may see fi t to make as to the guests he will entertain, or as to the people 
he will take into his coach or cab or car, or admit to his concert or theatre, or deal 
with in other matters of  intercourse or business.… [No] authority for the pas-
sage of  the law in question can be found in either the Thirteenth or Fourteenth 
Amendment of  the Constitution…. 
 Justice Harlan wrote a dissenting opinion.
 The opinion in these cases proceeds, it seems to me, upon grounds entirely too 
narrow and artifi cial. I cannot resist the conclusion that the substance and spirit 
of the recent amendments of the Constitution have been sacrifi ced by a subtle and 
ingenious verbal criticism.… Constitutional provisions, adopted in the interest 
of liberty, and for the purpose of securing, through national legislation, if  need 
be, rights inhering in a state of freedom, and belonging to American citizenship, 
have been so construed as to defeat the ends the people desired to accomplish…. 
[T] he court has departed from the familiar rule requiring, in the interpretation of 
constitutional provisions, that full effect be given to the intent with which they 
were adopted…. 
 The Thirteenth Amendment, it is conceded, did something more than to prohibit 
slavery as an institution, resting upon distinctions of race, and upheld by positive 
law.… [I] t established and decreed universal civil freedom throughout the United 
States. But did the freedom thus established involve nothing more than exemp-
tion from actual slavery? … Were the States against whose protest the institution 
was destroyed, to be left free … to make or allow discriminations against that 
race, as such, in the enjoyment of  those fundamental rights which by universal 
concession, inhere in a state of  freedom? … 
 That there are burdens and disabilities which constitute badges of slavery and 
servitude, and that the power to enforce by appropriate legislation the Thirteenth 
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equal protection of the laws.” It is State action of a particular character that is 
prohibited. Individual invasion of individual rights is not the subject-matter of the 
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subjects which are within the domain of State legislation; but to provide modes of 
relief  against State legislation, or State action, of the kind referred to. It does not 
authorize Congress to create a code of municipal law for the regulation of private 
rights; but to provide modes of redress against the operation of State laws, and 
the action of State offi cers executive or judicial, when these are subversive of the 
fundamental rights specifi ed in the amendment.… 
 [U] ntil some State law has been passed, or some State action through its offi cers 
or agents has been taken, adverse to the rights of citizens sought to be protected 
by the Fourteenth Amendment, no legislation of the United States under said 
amendment, nor any proceeding under such legislation, can be called into activ-
ity…. Of course, legislation may, and should be, provided in advance to meet 
the exigency when it arises; but it should be adapted to the mischief and wrong 
which the amendment was intended to provide against; and that is, State laws, 
or State action of some kind, adverse to the rights of the citizen secured by the 
amendment.… In fi ne, the legislation which Congress is authorized to adopt in 
this behalf  is not general legislation upon the rights of the citizen, but corrective 
legislation, that is, such as may be necessary and proper for counteracting such 
laws as the States may adopt or enforce … or such acts and proceedings as the 
States may commit or take, and which, by the amendment, they are prohibited 
from committing or taking.… 
 An inspection of  [this] law shows that it makes no reference whatever to any 
supposed or apprehended violation of  the Fourteenth Amendment on the part 
of  the States.… It proceeds … to declare that certain acts committed by indi-
viduals shall be deemed offences, and shall be prosecuted and punished by pro-
ceedings in the courts of  the United States. It does not profess to be corrective 
of  any constitutional wrong committed by the States…. In other words, it steps 
into the domain of  local jurisprudence, and lays down rules for the conduct of 
individuals in society towards each other…. 
 [C] ivil rights, such as are guaranteed by the Constitution against State aggression, 
cannot be impaired by the wrongful acts of individuals, unsupported by State 
authority…. The wrongful act of an individual, unsupported by any such author-
ity, is simply a private wrong … and may presumably be vindicated by resort to 
the laws of the State for redress.… Hence, in all those cases where the Constitution 
seeks to protect the rights of the citizen against discriminative and unjust laws of 
the State by prohibiting such laws, it is not individual offences, but abrogation and 
denial of rights, which it denounces, and for which it clothes the Congress with 
power to provide a remedy.… 
 [T] he law in question cannot be sustained by any grant of  legislative power made 
to Congress by the Fourteenth Amendment.… The law in question, without any 
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reference to adverse State legislation on the subject, declares that all persons 
shall be entitled to equal accommodations and privileges of  inns, public convey-
ances, and places of  public amusement, and imposes a penalty upon any indi-
vidual who shall deny to any citizen such equal accommodations and privileges. 
This is not corrective legislation…. What we have to decide is, whether such ple-
nary power has been conferred upon Congress by the Fourteenth Amendment; 
and, in our judgment, it has not. 
 But the power of  Congress … is sought, in the second place, from the Thirteenth 
Amendment, which abolishes slavery.… The only question under the present 
head, therefore, is, whether the refusal to any persons of  the accommodations 
of  an inn, or a public conveyance, or a place of  public amusement, by an indi-
vidual, and without any sanction or support from any State law or regulation, 
does infl ict upon such persons any manner of  servitude, or form of  slavery, as 
those terms are understood in this country? … The Thirteenth Amendment has 
respect, not to distinctions of  race, or class, or color, but to slavery.… 
 Can the act of  a mere individual, the owner of  the inn, the public conveyance or 
place of  amusement, refusing the accommodation, be justly regarded as impos-
ing any badge of  slavery or servitude upon the applicant…? [W] e are forced to 
the conclusion that such an act of  refusal has nothing to do with slavery or invol-
untary servitude, and that if  it is violative of  any right of  the party, his redress 
is to be sought under the laws of  the State…. It would be running the slavery 
argument into the ground to make it apply to every act of  discrimination which 
a person may see fi t to make as to the guests he will entertain, or as to the people 
he will take into his coach or cab or car, or admit to his concert or theatre, or deal 
with in other matters of  intercourse or business.… [No] authority for the pas-
sage of  the law in question can be found in either the Thirteenth or Fourteenth 
Amendment of  the Constitution…. 
 Justice Harlan wrote a dissenting opinion.
 The opinion in these cases proceeds, it seems to me, upon grounds entirely too 
narrow and artifi cial. I cannot resist the conclusion that the substance and spirit 
of the recent amendments of the Constitution have been sacrifi ced by a subtle and 
ingenious verbal criticism.… Constitutional provisions, adopted in the interest 
of liberty, and for the purpose of securing, through national legislation, if  need 
be, rights inhering in a state of freedom, and belonging to American citizenship, 
have been so construed as to defeat the ends the people desired to accomplish…. 
[T] he court has departed from the familiar rule requiring, in the interpretation of 
constitutional provisions, that full effect be given to the intent with which they 
were adopted…. 
 The Thirteenth Amendment, it is conceded, did something more than to prohibit 
slavery as an institution, resting upon distinctions of race, and upheld by positive 
law.… [I] t established and decreed universal civil freedom throughout the United 
States. But did the freedom thus established involve nothing more than exemp-
tion from actual slavery? … Were the States against whose protest the institution 
was destroyed, to be left free … to make or allow discriminations against that 
race, as such, in the enjoyment of  those fundamental rights which by universal 
concession, inhere in a state of  freedom? … 
 That there are burdens and disabilities which constitute badges of slavery and 
servitude, and that the power to enforce by appropriate legislation the Thirteenth 
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Amendment may be exerted by legislation of a direct and primary character, for 
the eradication, not simply of the institution, but of its badges and incidents, are 
propositions which ought to be deemed indisputable. They lie at the foundation 
of the Civil Rights Act of 1866.… I hold that since slavery … was the moving or 
principal cause of the adoption of that amendment, and since that institution 
rested wholly upon the inferiority, as a race, of those held in bondage, their free-
dom necessarily involved immunity from, and protection against, all discrimina-
tion against them, because of their race, in respect of such civil rights as belong 
to freemen of other races. Congress, therefore, under its express power to enforce 
that amendment, by appropriate legislation, may enact laws to protect that peo-
ple against the deprivation, because of their race, of any civil rights granted to 
other freemen in the same State; and such legislation may be of a direct and pri-
mary character, operating upon States, their offi cers and agents, and, also, upon, 
at least, such individuals and corporations as exercise public functions and wield 
power and authority under the State. What has been said is suffi cient to show 
that the power of Congress under the Thirteenth Amendment is not necessarily 
restricted to legislation against slavery as an institution upheld by positive law, 
but may be exerted to the extent, at least, of protecting the liberated race against 
discrimination, in respect of legal rights belonging to freemen, where such dis-
crimination is based upon race.… 
 Congress has not, in [addressing these places of public accommodation], entered 
the domain of State control and supervision. It does not … assume to prescribe 
the general conditions and limitations under which inns, public conveyances, and 
places of public amusement, shall be conducted or managed. It simply declares, 
in effect, that since the nation has established universal freedom in this country, 
for all time, there shall be no discrimination, based merely upon race or color, in 
respect of the accommodations and advantages of public conveyances, inns, and 
places of public amusement. 
 I am of the opinion that such discrimination practised by corporations and 
individuals in the exercise of  their public or quasi-public functions is a badge 
of  servitude the imposition of  which Congress may prevent under its power, 
by appropriate legislation, to enforce the Thirteenth Amendment; and, conse-
quently, … [the act] is not repugnant to the Constitution. 
 It remains now to consider these cases with reference to the power Congress has 
possessed since the adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment.… The theory of the 
opinion of the majority of the court … is, that the general government cannot, 
in advance of hostile State laws or hostile State proceedings, actively interfere 
for the protection of any of the rights, privileges, and immunities secured by the 
Fourteenth Amendment.… The assumption that this amendment consists wholly 
of prohibitions upon State laws and State proceedings in hostility to its provi-
sions, is unauthorized by its language. The fi rst clause of the fi rst section … is 
of a distinctly affi rmative character. In its application to the colored race, previ-
ously liberated, it created and granted, as well citizenship of the United States, 
as citizenship of the State in which they respectively resided. It introduced all of 
that race, whose ancestors had been imported and sold as slaves, at once, into the 
political community known as the “People of the United States.” … 
 The citizenship thus acquired, by that race … may be protected, not alone by 
the judicial branch of the government, but by congressional legislation of a pri-
mary direct character; this, because the power of Congress is not restricted to 
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the enforcement of prohibitions upon State laws or State action. It is, in terms 
distinct and positive, to enforce “the provisions of this article” of amendment; 
not simply those of a prohibitive character, but the provisions—all of the 
provisions—affi rmative and prohibitive, of the amendment. It is, therefore, a 
grave misconception to suppose that the fi fth section of the amendment has refer-
ence exclusively to express prohibitions upon State laws or State action.… 
 This court has always given a broad and liberal construction to the Constitution, 
so as to enable Congress, by legislation, to enforce rights secured by that instru-
ment. The legislation which Congress may enact, in execution of  its power to 
enforce the provisions of  this amendment, is such as may be appropriate to pro-
tect the right granted.… Under given circumstances, that which the court char-
acterizes as corrective legislation might be deemed by Congress appropriate and 
entirely suffi cient. Under other circumstances primary direct legislation may 
be required. But it is for Congress, not the judiciary, to say that legislation is 
appropriate—that is—best adapted to the end to be attained.… 
 I insist that the national legislature may, without transcending the limits of  the 
Constitution, do for human liberty and the fundamental rights of  American citi-
zenship, what it did, with the sanction of  this court, for the protection of  slavery 
and the rights of  the masters of  fugitive slaves. If  fugitive slave laws, provid-
ing modes and prescribing penalties, whereby the master could seize and recover 
his fugitive slave, were legitimate exercises of  an implied power to protect and 
enforce a right recognized by the Constitution, why shall the hands of  Congress 
be tied, so that—under an express power, by appropriate legislation, to enforce 
a constitutional provision granting citizenship—it may not, by means of  direct 
legislation, bring the whole power of  this nation to bear upon States and their 
offi cers, and upon such individuals and corporations exercising public functions 
as assume to abridge, impair, or deny rights confessedly secured by the supreme 
law of the land? … 
 My brethren say, that when a man has emerged from slavery, and by the aid of 
benefi cent legislation has shaken off  the inseparable concomitants of that state, 
there must be some stage in the progress of his elevation when he takes the rank 
of a mere citizen, and ceases to be the special favorite of the laws, and when his 
rights as a citizen, or a man, are to be protected in the ordinary modes by which 
other men’s rights are protected. It is, I submit, scarcely just to say that the colored 
race has been the special favorite of the laws. The statute of 1875, now adjudged 
to be unconstitutional, is for the benefi t of citizens of every race and color. What 
the nation, through Congress, has sought to accomplish in reference to that race, 
is—what had already been done in every State of the Union for the white race—to 
secure and protect rights belonging to them as freemen and citizens; nothing more. 
 Separate but Equal: The Start of a Half-Century Battle 
 The Supreme Court also erected a barrier to challenges to a variety of laws at the state level 
designed to ensure segregation in a wide range of fi elds of endeavor. These laws, collectively 
referred to as “Jim Crow” segregation, were in many important respects intended to twist 
the meaning of the equal protection of the laws so as to maintain inequality by pretending 
to create separate but supposedly equal facilities and services. 24  It was clear to any reason-
able observer that while they were separate, they were most assuredly not equal. In any 
case, how could enforced segregation of the races ever be equal under the Constitution 
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 Congress has not, in [addressing these places of public accommodation], entered 
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the enforcement of prohibitions upon State laws or State action. It is, in terms 
distinct and positive, to enforce “the provisions of this article” of amendment; 
not simply those of a prohibitive character, but the provisions—all of the 
provisions—affi rmative and prohibitive, of the amendment. It is, therefore, a 
grave misconception to suppose that the fi fth section of the amendment has refer-
ence exclusively to express prohibitions upon State laws or State action.… 
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entirely suffi cient. Under other circumstances primary direct legislation may 
be required. But it is for Congress, not the judiciary, to say that legislation is 
appropriate—that is—best adapted to the end to be attained.… 
 I insist that the national legislature may, without transcending the limits of  the 
Constitution, do for human liberty and the fundamental rights of  American citi-
zenship, what it did, with the sanction of  this court, for the protection of  slavery 
and the rights of  the masters of  fugitive slaves. If  fugitive slave laws, provid-
ing modes and prescribing penalties, whereby the master could seize and recover 
his fugitive slave, were legitimate exercises of  an implied power to protect and 
enforce a right recognized by the Constitution, why shall the hands of  Congress 
be tied, so that—under an express power, by appropriate legislation, to enforce 
a constitutional provision granting citizenship—it may not, by means of  direct 
legislation, bring the whole power of  this nation to bear upon States and their 
offi cers, and upon such individuals and corporations exercising public functions 
as assume to abridge, impair, or deny rights confessedly secured by the supreme 
law of the land? … 
 My brethren say, that when a man has emerged from slavery, and by the aid of 
benefi cent legislation has shaken off  the inseparable concomitants of that state, 
there must be some stage in the progress of his elevation when he takes the rank 
of a mere citizen, and ceases to be the special favorite of the laws, and when his 
rights as a citizen, or a man, are to be protected in the ordinary modes by which 
other men’s rights are protected. It is, I submit, scarcely just to say that the colored 
race has been the special favorite of the laws. The statute of 1875, now adjudged 
to be unconstitutional, is for the benefi t of citizens of every race and color. What 
the nation, through Congress, has sought to accomplish in reference to that race, 
is—what had already been done in every State of the Union for the white race—to 
secure and protect rights belonging to them as freemen and citizens; nothing more. 
 Separate but Equal: The Start of a Half-Century Battle 
 The Supreme Court also erected a barrier to challenges to a variety of laws at the state level 
designed to ensure segregation in a wide range of fi elds of endeavor. These laws, collectively 
referred to as “Jim Crow” segregation, were in many important respects intended to twist 
the meaning of the equal protection of the laws so as to maintain inequality by pretending 
to create separate but supposedly equal facilities and services. 24  It was clear to any reason-
able observer that while they were separate, they were most assuredly not equal. In any 
case, how could enforced segregation of the races ever be equal under the Constitution 
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when it operated to demean and hold back African Americans? That was the core of the 
battle against the separate but equal doctrine that would continue until  Brown v. Board of 
Education in 1954. 
 The origins of the separate but equal doctrine reach back well before the adoption of the 
Fourteenth Amendment and, indeed, before the Civil War. In fact, they grew out of a case 
decided by the supreme court of a Northern state, Massachusetts. For many Southerners 
there was a kind of cynical humor about the fact that the separate but equal doctrine arose 
in a Northern state. Of course, no such case could have arisen in a Southern state, since the 
African Americans were slaves and entitled to no rights to education comparable to those 
contested in the Massachusetts case. 
 Sarah C. Roberts v. City of Boston 
 59 Mass. (5 Cush. 198) 198 (1849) 
 INTRODUCTION: African American parents in Boston had petitioned the school 
board for the creation of schools for their children since they had been the victims of 
discrimination in the community. However, over time parents concluded that their 
children were being excluded from fi ne schools and kept in segregated and inadequate 
schools. In 1846 a group of African American parents petitioned the school authori-
ties to eliminate segregated schools. The school committee not only refused, but con-
cluded that: “the continuance of the separate schools for colored children, and the 
regular attendance of all such children upon the schools, is not only legal and just, but 
is best adapted to promote the education of that class of our population.” Benjamin 
F. Roberts sued on behalf  of his fi ve year old daughter, Sarah C. Roberts, to challenge 
the segregated schools, claiming that she had been denied admission and would be 
forced to attend an all-black school further from her home when there was a excellent 
white school closer to their residence. 
 Chief Justice Shaw wrote the opinion for the Court.
 The plaintiff  has commenced this action … against the city of Boston, upon the 
statute of 1845, c. 214, which provides, that any child unlawfully excluded from 
public school instruction, in this commonwealth, shall recover damages therefor, 
in an action against the city or town, by which such public school instruction is 
supported. The question therefore is, whether, upon the facts agreed, the plaintiff  
has been unlawfully excluded from such instruction.… The plaintiff  had access 
to a school, set apart for colored children, as well conducted in all respects, and 
as well fi tted, in point of capacity and qualifi cation of the instructors, to advance 
the education of children under seven years old, as the other primary schools; the 
objection is, that the schools thus open to the plaintiff  are exclusively appropri-
ated to colored children, and are at a greater distance from her home. Under these 
circumstances, the plaintiff  [has not] been unlawfully excluded from public school 
instruction? … 
 The great principle, advanced by the … plaintiff, is, that by the constitution and 
laws of  Massachusetts, all persons without distinction of  age or sex, birth or 
color, origin or condition, are equal before the law. This, as a broad general prin-
ciple, such as ought to appear in a declaration of  rights, is perfectly sound.… 
But, when this great principle comes to be applied to the actual and various 
conditions of  persons in society, it will not warrant the assertion, that men and 
women are legally clothed with the same civil and political powers, and that 
children and adults are legally to have the same functions and be subject to the 
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same treatment; but only that the rights of  all, as they are settled and regulated 
by law, are equally entitled to the paternal consideration and protection of  the 
law, for their maintenance and security. What those rights are, to which indi-
viduals, in the infi nite variety of  circumstances by which they are surrounded in 
society, are entitled, must depend on laws adapted to their respective relations 
and conditions.… 
 We must then resort to the law, to ascertain what are the rights of  individuals, in 
regard to the schools.… The statute, after directing what length of  time schools 
shall be kept in towns of  different numbers of  inhabitants and families, provides 
that the inhabitants shall annually choose, by ballot, a school committee, who 
shall have the general charge and superintendence of  all the public schools in 
such towns.… The power of  general superintendence vests a plenary authority 
in the committee to arrange, classify, and distribute pupils, in such a manner 
as they think best adapted to their general profi ciency and welfare.… [W] hen 
this power is reasonably exercised, without being abused or perverted by color-
able pretenses, the decision of  the committee must be deemed conclusive. The 
committee, apparently upon great deliberation, have come to the conclusion, 
that the good of  both classes of  schools will be best promoted, by maintaining 
the separate primary schools for colored and for white children, and we can 
perceive no ground to doubt, that this is the honest result of  their experience 
and judgment. 
 It is urged, that this maintenance of  separate schools tends to deepen and per-
petuate the odious distinction of  caste, founded in a deep-rooted prejudice in 
public opinion. This prejudice, if  it exists, is not created by law, and probably 
cannot be changed by law. Whether this distinction and prejudice, existing in the 
opinion and feelings of  the community, would not be as effectually fostered by 
compelling colored and white children to associate together in the same schools, 
may well be doubted; at all events, it is a fair and proper question for the commit-
tee to consider and decide upon … and we cannot say, that their decision upon 
it is not founded on just grounds of  reason and experience, and in the result of  a 
discriminating and honest judgment. 
 In 1896 the U.S. Supreme Court would refer to the argument from the  Roberts case and use it 
to make “separate but equal” lawful under the U.S. Constitution in  Plessy v. Ferguson . 
 Plessy v. Ferguson 
 163 U.S. 537 (1896) 
 INTRODUCTION: In 1890 Louisiana enacted a separate car act which required that 
railroad passengers be segregated into separate cars on the basis of race. The act made 
it a criminal violation for a person to refuse to sit in the segregated coach if  asked. The 
separate car act was also referred to as an Act for the Comfort and Convenience of 
Passengers. A group decided to challenge the law and selected Homer Adolph Plessy 
to test its constitutionality. Plessy appeared to be white and was by his own account 
only one-eighth non-white. The group purchased a ticket for Mr. Plessy and then 
informed the railroad of his heritage. 
 Plessy refused to move from the whites only coach to the segregated coach when 
asked to do so. He was arrested and the ensuing legal action provided the basis for a 
challenge to the separate car law. 
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only one-eighth non-white. The group purchased a ticket for Mr. Plessy and then 
informed the railroad of his heritage. 
 Plessy refused to move from the whites only coach to the segregated coach when 
asked to do so. He was arrested and the ensuing legal action provided the basis for a 
challenge to the separate car law. 
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 Justice Brown wrote the opinion for the Court. 
 The constitutionality of this act is attacked upon the ground that it confl icts both 
with the Thirteenth Amendment of the Constitution, abolishing slavery, and the 
Fourteenth Amendment, which prohibits certain restrictive legislation on the part 
of the States. 
 That it does not confl ict with the Thirteenth Amendment, which abolished slavery 
and involuntary servitude, except as a punishment for crime, is too clear for argu-
ment. Slavery implies involuntary servitude—a state of bondage; the ownership 
of mankind as a chattel, or at least the control of the labor and services of one 
man for the benefi t of another…. [I] n the  Civil Rights Cases , … [Justice Bradley 
wrote:] “It would be running the slavery argument into the ground to make it 
apply to every act of discrimination which a person may see fi t to make as to the 
guests he will entertain, or as to the people he will take into his coach or cab or 
car, or admit to his concert or theatre, or deal with in other matters of intercourse 
or business.” A statute which implies merely a legal distinction between the white 
and colored races—a distinction which is founded in the color of the two races, 
and which must always exist so long as white men are distinguished from the other 
race by color—has no tendency to destroy the legal equality of the two races, or 
reestablish a state of involuntary servitude.… 
 By the Fourteenth Amendment … the States are forbidden from making or 
enforcing any law which shall … deny to any person within their jurisdiction the 
equal protection of the laws.… The object of the amendment was undoubtedly to 
enforce the absolute equality of the two races before the law, but in the nature of 
things it could not have been intended to abolish distinctions based upon color, 
or to enforce social, as distinguished from political equality, or a commingling 
of the two races upon terms unsatisfactory to either. Laws permitting, and even 
requiring, their separation in places where they are liable to be brought into con-
tact do not necessarily imply the inferiority of either race to the other, and have 
been generally, if  not universally, recognized as within the competency of the state 
legislatures in the exercise of their police power. The most common instance of 
this is connected with the establishment of separate schools for white and colored 
children, which has been held to be a valid exercise of the legislative power even 
by courts of States where the political rights of the colored race have been longest 
and most earnestly enforced. 
 [In]  Roberts v. City of Boston the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts held 
that the general school committee of Boston had power to make provision for 
the instruction of colored children in separate schools established exclusively for 
them, and to prohibit their attendance upon the other schools.… Similar laws 
have been enacted by Congress under its general power of legislation over the 
District of Columbia … as well as by the legislatures of many of the States, and 
have been generally, if  not uniformly, sustained by the courts.… 
 Laws forbidding the intermarriage of the two races may be said in a technical 
sense to interfere with the freedom of contract, and yet have been universally rec-
ognized as within the police power of the State.… 
 [E] very exercise of  the police power must be reasonable, and extend only to such 
laws as are enacted in good faith for the promotion for the public good, and not 
for the annoyance or oppression of  a particular class.… So far, then, as a con-
fl ict with the Fourteenth Amendment is concerned, the case reduces itself  to the 
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question whether the statute of  Louisiana is a reasonable regulation, and with 
respect to this there must necessarily be a large discretion on the part of  the leg-
islature. In determining the question of  reasonableness it is at liberty to act with 
reference to the established usages, customs and traditions of  the people, and 
with a view to the promotion of  their comfort, and the preservation of  the public 
peace and good order. Gauged by this standard, we cannot say that a law which 
authorizes or even requires the separation of  the two races in public conveyances 
is unreasonable, or more obnoxious to the Fourteenth Amendment than the acts 
of  Congress requiring separate schools for colored children in the District of 
Columbia, the constitutionality of  which does not seem to have been questioned, 
or the corresponding acts of  state legislatures. 
 We consider the underlying fallacy of the plaintiff ’s argument to consist in the 
assumption that the enforced separation of the two races stamps the colored race 
with a badge of inferiority. If  this be so, it is not by reason of anything found 
in the act, but solely because the colored race chooses to put that construction 
upon it.… If the two races are to meet upon terms of social equality, it must be 
the result of natural affi nities, a mutual appreciation of each other’s merits and a 
voluntary consent of individuals.… If one race be inferior to the other socially, 
the Constitution of the United States cannot put them upon the same plane. The 
judgment of the court below is, therefore, affi rmed. 
 Justice Harlan wrote a dissenting opinion.
 … In respect of civil rights, common to all citizens, the Constitution of the United 
States does not, I think, permit any public authority to know the race of those 
entitled to be protected in the enjoyment of such rights.… I deny that any legis-
lative body or judicial tribunal may have regard to the race of citizens when the 
civil rights of those citizens are involved. Indeed, such legislation, as that here in 
question, is inconsistent not only with that equality of rights which pertains to 
citizenship, National and State, but with the personal liberty enjoyed by every one 
within the United States. 
 The Thirteenth Amendment does not permit the withholding or the depriva-
tion of any right necessarily inhering in freedom. It not only struck down the 
institution of slavery as previously existing in the United States, but it prevents 
the imposition of any burdens or disabilities that constitute badges of slavery or 
servitude. It decreed universal civil freedom in this country.… [It] was followed 
by the Fourteenth Amendment, which added greatly to the dignity and glory of 
American citizenship, and to the security of personal liberty…. These two amend-
ments, if  enforced according to their true intent and meaning, will protect all the 
civil rights that pertain to freedom and citizenship. Finally, … it was declared by 
the Fifteenth Amendment that “the right of citizens of the United States to vote 
shall not be denied or abridged by the United States or by any State on account of 
race, color or previous condition of servitude.” 
 These notable additions to the fundamental law were welcomed by the friends of 
liberty throughout the world. They removed the race line from our governmental 
systems. They had, as this court has said, a common purpose, namely, to secure 
“to a race recently emancipated, a race that through many generations have been 
held in slavery, all the civil rights that the superior race enjoy.” They declared, in 
legal effect, this court has further said, “that the law in the States shall be the same 
for the black as for the white; that all persons, whether colored or white, shall 
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stand equal before the laws of the States, and, in regard to the colored race, for 
whose protection the amendment was primarily designed, that no discrimination 
shall be made against them by law because of their color.”… 
 It was said in argument that the statute of  Louisiana does not discriminate against 
either race, but prescribes a rule applicable alike to white and colored citizens. 
But this argument does not meet the diffi culty. Everyone knows that the statute 
in question had its origin in the purpose, not so much to exclude white persons 
from railroad cars occupied by blacks, as to exclude colored people from coaches 
occupied by or assigned to white persons.… The thing to accomplish was, under 
the guise of  giving equal accommodation for whites and blacks, to compel the 
latter to keep to themselves while traveling in railroad passenger coaches. No 
one would be so wanting in candor as to assert the contrary. The fundamental 
objection, therefore, to the statute is that it interferes with the personal freedom 
of citizens.… If  a white man and a black man choose to occupy the same public 
conveyance on a public highway, it is their right to do so, and no government, 
proceeding alone on grounds of  race, can prevent it without infringing the per-
sonal liberty of each. 
 It is one thing for railroad carriers to furnish, or to be required by law to furnish, 
equal accommodations…. It is quite another thing for government to forbid citi-
zens of the white and black races from traveling in the same public conveyance, 
and to punish offi cers of railroad companies for permitting persons of the two 
races to occupy the same passenger coach. If  a State can prescribe, as a rule of 
civil conduct, that whites and blacks shall not travel as passengers in the same 
railroad coach, why may it not so regulate the use of the streets of its cities and 
towns as to compel white citizens to keep on one side of a street and black citizens 
to keep on the other? … 
 The white race deems itself  to be the dominant race in this country.… But in 
view of the Constitution, in the eye of the law, there is in this country no supe-
rior, dominant, ruling class of citizens. There is no caste here. Our Constitution 
is color-blind, and neither knows nor tolerates classes among citizens. In respect 
of civil rights, all citizens are equal before the law. The humblest is the peer of the 
most powerful. The law regards man as man, and takes no account of his sur-
roundings or of his color when his civil rights as guaranteed by the supreme law 
of the land are involved. It is, therefore, to be regretted that this high tribunal, the 
fi nal expositor of the fundamental law of the land, has reached the conclusion 
that it is competent for a State to regulate the enjoyment by citizens of their civil 
rights solely upon the basis of race. 
 In my opinion, the judgment this day rendered will, in time, prove to be quite as 
pernicious as the decision made by this tribunal in the  Dred Scott case.… The 
present decision, it may well be apprehended, will not only stimulate aggressions, 
more or less brutal and irritating, upon the admitted rights of colored citizens, but 
will encourage the belief  that it is possible, by means of state enactments, to defeat 
the benefi cent purposes which the people of the United States had in view when 
they adopted the recent amendments of the Constitution…. The destinies of the 
two races, in this country, are indissolubly linked together, and the interests of 
both require that the common government of all shall not permit the seeds of race 
hate to be planted under the sanction of law. What can more certainly arouse race 
hate, what more certainly create and perpetuate a feeling of distrust between these 
races, than state enactments, which, in fact, proceed on the ground that colored 
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citizens are so inferior and degraded that they cannot be allowed to sit in public 
coaches occupied by white citizens? That, as all will admit, is the real meaning of 
such legislation as was enacted in Louisiana. 
 The sure guarantee of the peace and security of each race is the clear, distinct, 
unconditional recognition by our governments, National and State, of every right 
that inheres in civil freedom, and of the equality before the law of all citizens of 
the United States without regard to race.… The arbitrary separation of citizens, 
on the basis of race, while they are on a public highway, is a badge of servitude 
wholly inconsistent with the civil freedom and the equality before the law estab-
lished by the Constitution. It cannot be justifi ed upon any legal grounds.… 
 The  Plessy case was about segregation in transportation, but the Supreme Court later 
extended the  Plessy doctrine to schools as well in  Cumming v. Richmond County Board of 
Education 25  and  Gong Lum v. Rice . 26  
 Conclusion 
 Justice Marshall pressed Americans to concentrate on the need to work together toward a 
Constitution in daily life that would live up to the promise of  the great rhetoric it presents, 
not only as it was issued originally, but with all of  the important improvements made to it 
over its more 200 year history. That includes not only the document itself, but the interpre-
tations and application of  that law by the courts of  the United States so that all Americans, 
including African Americans, can be confi dent that they truly enjoy the equal protection 
of  the laws. 
 At the same time Marshall argued passionately that Americans need to understand what 
the failures of our Constitutional history have meant for the ways in which many African 
Americans understand their nation and place in it. To do that, it is necessary to pay atten-
tion to what our founding documents and our case law have said to and about African 
Americans as well as the way in which their experiences over time have been described by 
offi cials whose task it is to ensure equal protection of the laws. This chapter has provided 
some of the saddest of lessons about that history and meanest of rhetoric from the very 
justices whose responsibility it was to do equal justice to all. 
 Chapter 3 presents the long struggle forward from  Plessy to  Brown v. Board of Education 
and beyond. It is a story of struggle and endurance with many steps forward, but it is also a 
story that Justice Marshall was quick to say is far from successfully completed. 
 I.  Issues for Policy and Practice 
 A.  Given the limitations imposed by the Supreme Court’s opinion in the  Civil Rights Cases , what 
can Congress do, if  anything, using the enforcement powers of Section 5 of the Fourteenth 
Amendment to address discriminatory behavior by anyone other than government? 
 B.  What are the implications of a requirement that Congress use the power to regulate inter-
state commerce to get at discrimination by businesses or individuals? 
 C.  On the one hand, there is a longstanding goal of ensuring that policies are “color blind,” 
in the sense that they are not discriminatory. On the other, there is a need to ensure that 
resources can be targeted to get to those who need them, which often involves policies 
designed to assist African Americans, Latinos, Native Americans, women, or persons with 
disabilities. What policy design approaches are available to accomplish both goals? 
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 II.  Discussion Questions 
 A.  Justice Marshall pointed out that, although it is easy to point to the Southern states where 
slavery was offi cially sanctioned and so much a part of life as the problem for both slavery 
and ultimately racism in the United States, Northern states were fully engaged in the slave 
trade and profi ted greatly from it. Is this unwillingness to see that the whole country was 
implicated in the history of slavery part of the contemporary diffi culty with coming to 
grips with racism? 
 B.  Contemporary slavery prosecutions (often presented as human traffi cking cases) show once 
again that race and economics are tied together. Is there a willingness to address the demand 
for cheap products and services and a desire to assert class status that is supporting this 
modern version of the historic problem? If so, what can be done to address those tendencies? 
 C.  The ruling in the  Slaughter-House Cases that effectively nullifi ed the “privileges and immu-
nities” clause of the Fourteenth Amendment has never been overturned. However, Article 
IV also contains a privileges and immunities clause, and that clause has actually been used 
to strike down some state and local action. (See  United Building & Construction Trades 
Council v. Camden , 465 U.S. 208 (1984);  Hicklin  v.  Orbeck , 437 U.S. 518 (1978).) What do 
you think are (or should be) the privileges and immunities of an American citizen protected 
by the Constitution? 
 D.  Justice Marshall wrote of Justice Powell’s comments about getting beyond history and not 
focusing on race. How can we deal with the fact that some Americans take the attitude 
that historic discrimination has been outlawed and it is a new day, while for many African 
Americans, and persons of other ethnocultural or racial minorities for that matter, things 
have not changed in many important respects? In any case, they are quick to note, the his-
torical trauma of a legacy of discrimination is still very real in people’s lives. Are there steps 
that we can take to recognize that there have been some changes and yet there remains dis-
crimination, and also the impact of a long history of unequal protection of law and policy? 
 E.  Most Americans have encountered references to the  Dred Scott decision at some point in 
their education. Now you have read the language of that opinion and the way it describes 
African Americans, something few Americans have done. What are your reactions to it? 
What do you think are the reactions that African Americans are likely to have to it? 
 Notes 
 1  See  Howard  Ball ,  A Defi ant Life:  Thurgood Marshall & the Persistence of Racism in America 
( New  York :   Crown Publishers ,  1998 );  Michael D.  Davis and  Hunter R.  Clark ,  Thurgood 
Marshall: Warrior at the Bar, Rebel on the Bench , revised edn . ( New York :  Citadel Press ,  1994 ). 
 2  See  Richard  Kluger ,  Simple Justice ( New York :  Vintage ,  1977 ). 
 3  Thurgood Marshall, “Memorandum to the Conference,” April 13, 1978, Brennan Papers, Box 465, 
pp. 1–3. 
 4  Regents v. Bakke , 438 U.S. 265 (1978). 
 5  See  John C.  Jeffries , Jr.,  Justice Lewis F. Powell , Jr. ( New York :  Charles Scribner’s Sons ,  1994 ), p.  688 . 
 6  Discussed further in  Phillip J.  Cooper ,  Battles on the Bench ( Lawrence, KS :   University Press of 
Kansas ,  1995 ), pp.  11 – 17 . 
 7  Regents v. Bakke , 438 U.S., at pp. 387–401, Marshall, J., dissenting. 
 8  Thurgood  Marshall , “ The Constitution’s Bicentennial: Commemorating the Wrong Document?” 
 Vanderbilt Law Review  40 (No.6  1987 ):  1337 – 1342 ;  Commentary: “Refl ections on the Bicentennial 
of the United States Constitution ,”  Harvard Law Review  101 (Nov.  1987 ):  1 – 5 ; “ We the People: A 
Celebration of the Bicentennial of the United States Constitution ,”  Howard Law Journal  30 ( 1987 ): 
 623 – 628 . 
 9  Thurgood Marshall, “Commentary:  Refl ections on the Bicentennial of  the United States 
Constitution,” p. 5. 
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 10  Id., at 2. 
 11  Id . 
 12  Id., at 3. 
 13  1 Stat. 302 (1793). 
 14  See  Abraham L.  Davis and  Barbara Luck  Graham , eds.,  The Supreme Court, Race, and Civil 
Rights ( Thousand Oaks, CA :  Sage Publications ,  1995 ), p. 6. 
 15  NOTE: In contemporary case law, this concept is known as pre-emption and is justifi ed under the 
supremacy clause of  Article VI. Specifi cally, when Congress is said to have intended to occupy the 
whole fi eld, leaving no room for the state legislatures to act, it is known as “fi eld pre-emption.” 
See  Arizona v. United States , 132 S. Ct. 2492, 2501–02 (2012);  Crosby v. National Foreign Trade 
Council , 530 U.S. 363, 372 (2000). 
 16  NOTE: The “necessary and proper” language is a reference is to Article I, §8, cl. 18 which provides 
that Congress shall have the power: “To make all Laws which shall be necessary and proper for 
carrying into Execution the foregoing Powers and all other Powers vested by this Constitution in 
the Government of the United States, or in any Department or Offi cer thereof.” 
 17  NOTE: Justice Wayne wrote a concurring opinion omitted here. 
 18  NOTE: Justices Thompson and Daniel issued separate opinions similar to the argument advanced 
by Taney. 
 19  16 Stat. 545 (1820). 
 20  NOTE: He is referring here to Article IV, §3, cl. 2 of the Constitution. 
 21  NOTE: Justices Wayne, Nelson, Grier, Daniel, Campbell, and Carton issued concurring opinions 
that have been omitted here. 
 22  Abraham Lincoln, Emancipation Proclamation, January 1, 1863,  http://avalon.law.yale.edu/19th_
century/emancipa.asp , April 6, 2013. 
 23  NOTE: Justice Bradley also fi led a dissenting opinion on grounds similar to Justice Field’s opinion. 
 24  The term Jim Crow is commonly traced to a routine performed in the 1830s and 1840s by a popu-
lar white entertainer named Thomas Dartmouth Rice, who sang and danced in blackface, affecting 
a demeaning caricature of African Americans named Jim Crow. In that act he sang a song entitled 
“Jump Jim Crow.” This term later was used to refer to a series of laws enacted in the South during 
the reconstruction era to ensure segregation and inequality among African Americans. See Ferris 
State University, “Jim Crow Museum: Origins of Jim Crow,”  www.ferris.edu/jimcrow/origins.htm , 
June 14, 2014. 
 25  175 U.S. 528 (1899). 
 26  275 U.S. 78 (1927). 
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focusing on race. How can we deal with the fact that some Americans take the attitude 
that historic discrimination has been outlawed and it is a new day, while for many African 
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have not changed in many important respects? In any case, they are quick to note, the his-
torical trauma of a legacy of discrimination is still very real in people’s lives. Are there steps 
that we can take to recognize that there have been some changes and yet there remains dis-
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